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Abstract 
 
The military regime overthrew the elected government in Pakistan in 1999. In order 
to legitimize their overtaking of power, it immediately announced a national 
reconstruction plan. This plan, among other components, put forward an elaborate 
proposal of devolution & decentralization along with creation of a local government 
system. This study is an overview of devolution in Pakistan introduced in 2001 with 
the election to local governments and promulgation of a local government ordinance. 
It covers the period from 2001 to 2003 during which the local governments went 
through the teething phases.  
 
The study looks at the context under which local governments have existed in 
Pakistan. It analyses the process of devolution by looking at its political, 
administrative, fiscal and development components. It identifies the specific 
problems being faced in implementation by various stakeholders and offers policy 
prescriptions to remedy the identified problems. The outcomes of the study target the 
government agencies involved in implementation of the process, various related 
agencies, donor organizations supporting the process and researchers and common 
people having interest in the subject. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
1. Introduction  
 
1.1. Decentralization, or decentralizing governance, refers to the restructuring or 
reorganization of authority so that there is a system of co-responsibility 
between institutions of governance at the central, regional and local levels 
according to the principle of subsidiarity (i.e. the local authorities will have the 
authority and responsibility to address all problems that are, in their 
determination, within their ability to solve), thus increasing the overall quality 
and effectiveness of the system of governance, while increasing the authority 
and capacities of sub-national levels1.  
 
1.2. Devolution, along with two other types of decentralization (fiscal and 
administrative), is the transfer of resources and power (and often, tasks) to 
lower-level authorities which are largely or wholly independent of higher 
levels of government, and which are democratic in some way and to some 
degree2. Devolution/Decentralization is not unique to Pakistan, but a global 
trend. Most developing countries are embracing decentralization whether in 
Latin America, Europe or East Asia. Decentralization is a worldwide 
phenomenon for at least two reasons a) need for political stability- 
decentralization means dispersion of formal political power to elected local 
level politicians. This dispersion of power is global trend.3 Political scientists 
suggest that this is an outcome of the declining credibility of the centralized 
state. In a fundamental sense, decentralization is a strategy to maintain 
political stability; and b) more effective and efficient service delivery4. 
Decentralization is expected to achieve higher economic efficiency, better 
accountability, larger resource mobilization, lower cost of service provision 
and higher satisfaction of local preferences. According to this devolving 
resource allocation decisions to locally elected leaders can improve the 
match between the mix of services produced by the public sector and the 
preferences of the local population. Decentralization is thought to be 
particularly beneficial for rural development in disadvantaged jurisdictions. It 
usually entails a net transfer of fiscal resources from richer to poorer areas 
and leads to an increase in the quantity and quality of expenditures in these 
areas. Pakistan’s experiment in decentralization, termed devolution due 
perhaps to its political component, basically aims at bringing the above-
mentioned benefits to its population. 
 
1.3. In October 1999, the politically elected government was overthrown as the 
military took over power in Pakistan. The Military Government immediately 
came up with a “seven point agenda” to address the so-called institutional 
crisis and to advance “national reconstruction”. The seven point agenda 
included the following: i) rebuilding national confidence & morale; ii) 
strengthening the federation while removing inter-provincial disharmony; iii) 
                                                 
1 UNDP, 1999. Decentralization: A sampling of definitions 
2 Manor, J. 1999. The Political Economy of Democratic Decentralization, World Bank 
3 World Development Report 1999-2000 
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4 There is another argument cited in the literature- decentralization may actually cause a decline in the 
quality of public service. It is exactly this concern that has prompted many countries in Latin America 
to favor a slow pace of decentralization 
 reviving and restoring investor confidence; iv) ensuring law and order and 
dispensing speedy justice; v) depoliticizing state institutions; vi) devolving 
power to the grass root level; vii) ensuring swift and across the board 
accountability. 
 
1.4. Consequently, the National Reconstruction Bureau, headed by a retired 
general, was entrusted with the task of undertaking the exercise with multiple 
aims of restructuring of political and service structures through devolution of 
power including empowerment of citizens, decentralization of administrative 
authority, decentralization of professional functions, and distribution of 
financial resources to the provincial and local governments with checks and 
balances against misuse of power and authority through the diffusion of 
power-authority nexus. 
 
 
1.5. The task was controversial and massive by any definition. Controversial 
because a plan for local government was being prepared and implemented 
centrally by a military government. Massive it was as it involved creation of 
new structures and systems, as old ones were not considered sufficient, hold 
elections under the new system and provide the new setup with necessary 
legal cover, training and finances to play their anticipated role effectively. It 
needs special mention that the whole exercise was being undertaken in a 
country with population exceeding 140 million people. As if all these 
difficulties were not enough, the military government was also working 
against deadlines as per ruling of the Supreme Court of Pakistan where the 
power had to be transferred to the politically elected government within three 
years i.e. by October 2002. 
 
1.6. The devolution exercise was being undertaken in a country, which was 
traditionally over-centralized right from its creation from British India. The 
centuries old setup specially that involving bureaucratic machinery was being 
revamped. All these factors called for a scrutiny of the whole exercise in 
order to find out problems, draw lessons and offer corrective policy 
recommendations. Hence came into being the current study with the 
following objectives: 
 
1.7.  Objectives of the research  
 
1.8. This study is an overview of devolution in Pakistan, among the first studies on 
this topic. The challenge was to keep this study simple, focused, time bound 
and feasible. The Overview did not attempt to answer every possible 
question on decentralization. It is intended as a descriptive study of what is 
going on. The study has favored coverage over depth and description over 
analysis.  
 
1.9. This Overview is structured around following themes: 
 
1.9.1. Study the overall devolution program in terms of its content, 
implementation structures, processes, areas of concentration, and 
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 political undertones and repercussions. 
1.9.2. Analyze the actual implementation after holding of local body elections, 
transitional period between transfer of power and accompanying 
process of fiscal decentralization to find its status, effect and suggest 
corrective policy measures. 
1.9.3. Identify the political implications of the devolution of power in terms of 
future policy making in the context of similar exercises (Basic 
Democracy System in Pakistan) undertaken in the past.  
1.9.4. Compare similar exercises in other countries and ex-colonies for 
finding their experiences in devolution of power in terms of cross 
cutting themes such as political developments, impact on policy 
making, their methods, and overall success in terms of actual 
dissipation of centralized power for drawing lessons, if any. 
1.9.5. Draw up a set of policy guidelines in matters relating to devolution, 
decentralization, political empowerment, and public policy.  
 
1.10. These themes are analyzed along following aspects: (a) political 
decentralization, the transfer of policy and legislative powers to local councils 
that have been democratically elected and establishment of mechanisms of 
accountability to local constituents; (b) administrative decentralization, the 
transfer of functional responsibilities in various sectors as well as staff 
resources to the jurisdiction of elected local governments; (c) fiscal 
decentralization, the transfer of revenue, budgeting and expenditure authority 
to local elected bodies; and (d) development planning & management, 
although linked with the other themes but was looked at separately in order to 
see the outcome of the process on development. 
 
 
1.11. The audience of the study is diverse. Among those it is directed at 
government agencies involved in the design of the process and those 
undergoing the change. The Overview hopes to offer them a structured and 
issue based discussion of where Pakistan is in the process of devolution. 
Others include donor agencies involved in supporting the process. The study 
will also serve as a reference for researchers and other private-sector entities 
interested in the subject.  
 
1.12. Research Methodology & scope of research 
 
1.13. The study is an overview and the methodology is simple. It is based on 
observation and common sense; although it is also supported by evidence 
collected through following methods: (1) review of the literature, relevant 
legislation5 (2) structured as well as non-structured interviews6 with a large 
number of stakeholders in capitals, districts, Tehsils & Unions; (3) an 
international comparison of key features of decentralization between Pakistan 
and other countries. Four provinces of Pakistan were visited. These visits 
included meetings at the provincial government and district levels.  
                                                 
5 Devolution Plan, 2000, Local Government Ordinance, 2001 etc 
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6 Questionnaires for interviews may be seen as Annex 6 
 1.14. Given the nature and timing of the whole exercise, research material 
on the subject pertaining to Pakistan was limited. The preliminary comments 
started to come only after the devolution plan was first made public in March 
2000 for debate. It must be mentioned, however, that there is a rich body of 
literature available on the subject of decentralization, its theory and some 
lessons from its implementation in different parts of the world. This literature 
provided the secondary source of research. 
 
1.15. No specific framework was used to judge progress against standard 
decentralization and devolution indicators. The reason was preliminary 
stages of the whole set-up. The study, however, suggests a framework for 
future detailed study on analyzing devolution and decentralization in Pakistan 
in terms of its outputs rather than the processes, on which the present study 
focuses.  
 
 
1.16. It is worth mentioning that the devolution plan was finalized in August 
2000, just within four months of its uncovering. After that the process of 
elections began which was completed in August 2001. At this time, a Local 
Government Ordinance was promulgated to provide legal cover to the newly 
elected local governments. The research period (March 2002-2003) covers 
the elections of the local governments and their initial period of working. The 
same time period saw the elections to national and provincial legislatures and 
the resulting issues in terms of relationships between the local governments 
and other elected bodies. This paper, after contextualizing devolution, looks 
at the political, administrative and fiscal structures and systems as outlined 
by the new Ordinance and offers policy recommendations where problems 
have been identified. 
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2. Background – Local governments in Pakistan7 
 
2.1. Pakistan is an Islamic Republic, formed out of the partition of British India on 
14 August 1947, and consisted originally of two wings, West Pakistan (now 
Pakistan) and East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) separated by 1,600 km of 
Indian territory. Pakistan today comprises Balochistan, North West Frontier 
Province, Punjab and Sindh; two federally – administered areas (Federally 
Administered Northern Areas (FANA) and the Federally – Administered Tribal 
Areas (FATA); Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK); and the Federal Capital 
Area (FCA) of Islamabad. With an estimated population of 145 million, 
Pakistan is the 8th most populous country in the world. Punjab is the most 
populous comprising more than half of the total population (estimated at 56 
percent) compared to Balochistan, which has only about 5 percent of 
Pakistan’s population but 44 percent of the land area. Regional disparity 
between the four provinces is an important issue in Pakistan since they very 
greatly in terms of size, population and levels of development. The country’s 
population is relatively young, with approximately half of the population under 
20 years of age and about 2 percent under the age of 19.  
 
2.2. Pakistan has a federal administrative structure guided by the Constitution of 
Pakistan of 1973 with amendments. Parliament consists of the National 
Assembly and the Senate. National Assembly members are directly elected 
on adult franchise basis and have a term of 5 years in office. The National 
Assembly determines the major policy issues and passes annual budget and 
legislation. It elects the Prime Minister from among its members. The Prime 
Minister forms the cabinet from among members of the National Assembly 
and the senate. Provinces have their own elected legislative assemblies and 
Chief Ministers. Majority of the members of the Senate are elected by the 
Provincial Assemblies on the basis of proportional representation.  
 
2.3. The allocation of functions of the federal government and the provincial 
governments is specified by the Constitution with the former having the 
authority to make laws with respect to any matter in the Federal Legislative 
List and the later in the Concurrent Legislative List. However in case of a 
dispute between the two, the writ of federal government shall prevail, hence 
providing for the root of centralization in Pakistan. Until the introduction of 
current legal changes8, the Constitution of Pakistan did not fully recognize 
local governments as separate tier of government with their own powers and 
functions. They were essentially viewed as extensions of the provincial 
governments, having been created by the provincial legislation, through 
which some functions were delegated to them.  
 
2.4. Pakistan has a poor track record of democracy as for more than half of its 
years of existence after independence, it has been ruled by the military. 
While the military governments always found faults with the politicians, it was 
always them who created the local government systems. Pakistan has 
                                                 
7 For a background on Local Governments in Pakistan, this chapter draws on “Local Government 
Administration in Pakistan”, Applied Economics Research Center, University of Karachi, 1991. 
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8 Legal Framework Order, 2002. 
 experimented with two systems of local government before the present 
devolution plan. These were in 1959 and then in 1979, both during military 
regimes. The present devolution plan is also a brainchild of military 
government. History of local governments in Pakistan is characterized by two 
factors; Firstly, the local governments have never been autonomously 
functional in the presence of democratic governments. Secondly, every time 
a new system of local government was created, it was totally from a scratch 
with no linkages to the previous system.  
 
2.5. Under the previous system of local government, there were four levels of 
municipal government in the urban areas: town committees, municipal 
committees, municipal corporations and metropolitan corporations. Members 
of the council elected the senior officers of these councils and the controlling 
authority was the elected house. There was a three-tier system of local 
government in operation in Pakistan in the rural areas, where Union Councils, 
Tehsil or Taluka Councils and District Councils were supposed to exist. 
However, provincial governments in practice usually abolished the middle-
tier, the Tehsil/Taluka level. As a result mainly Union Councils and District 
Councils existed, which were elected on the basis of adult franchise. The 
elected members then elected the Chairmen of these councils themselves. 
Municipal status was primarily a function of population. Two types of 
functions were allocated to local governments-compulsory and optional. 
Compulsory functions for urban local councils included sanitation and 
garbage disposal, water supply, drainage, education (primary), fire fighting, 
public streets, street lighting, and social welfare. Whereas major functions of 
rural councils included provision, maintenance and improvement of public 
roads, water supply, drainage, primary schools, medical and veterinary 
services. 
  
2.6. In practice, however, the councils were just performing some of the functions. 
It has been argued that the allocation of functions to the councils was very 
liberal. However, the availability of resources and institutional capacity for 
undertaking development work have been the operative constraints. Since 
local governments were not a central part of the Constitution and were 
delegated powers by the provincial governments, local governments actually 
owed their existence and powers to the provincial governments. Provincial 
governments could dismiss local governments by themselves or on the 
advice of the federal government. This was a subjective and dominating, 
relationship; local governments did not operate independently from the 
provincial government and could hardly exercise any influence. From senior 
appointments to requests for more resources or the permission to increase 
taxes and rates, local governments were dependent upon their provinces. It 
would not be unfair to say that provinces controlled local governments. 
Besides, the budgets of local councils had to be approved by the provincial 
government, who were entitled to make amendments and suggestions9.  
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 2.7. The purpose of giving an overview of the old system was to prepare a ground 
for comparison with what the new plan promises to offer by way of 
addressing the issues identified.  
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 3. Local Government Plan 2000: The new local government system10 
 
 
3.1. In October 1999, the politically elected government was overthrown as the 
military took over power in Pakistan. The Military Government immediately 
came up with a “seven point agenda” to address the so-called institutional 
crisis and to advance “national reconstruction”. The seven point agenda 
included the following: i) rebuilding national confidence & morale; ii) 
strengthening the federation while removing inter-provincial disharmony; iii) 
reviving and restoring investor confidence; iv) ensuring law and order and 
dispensing speedy justice; v) depoliticizing state institutions; vi) devolving 
power to the grass root level; vii) ensuring swift and across the board 
accountability. 
 
3.2. Consequently, the National Reconstruction Bureau (NRB) was entrusted 
with the task of undertaking the exercise with multiple aims of restructuring of 
political and service structures through devolution of power including 
empowerment of citizens, decentralization of administrative authority, 
decentralization of professional functions, and distribution of financial 
resources to the provincial and local governments with checks and balances 
against misuse of power and authority through the diffusion of power-
authority nexus. 
 
3.3. NRB put forward the Local Government Plan in year 2000. According to this 
plan, “in the existing system of governance at the local level, the province 
governs the districts and tehsils directly through the bureaucracy at the 
division, district and tehsil levels. And the local government for towns and 
cities exist separately from those of the rural areas. The provincial 
bureaucratic set-ups are the designated ‘controlling authorities’ of the local 
governments, and tend to undermine and over-ride them, which breeds a 
colonial relationship of ‘ruler’ and ‘subject’. The separate local government 
structures engender rural-urban antagonism, while the administration’s role 
as ‘controlling authorities’ accentuates the rural-urban divide. These two 
structural and systemic disjoints, coupled with the absence of horizontal 
integration and the consequent inadequacy of functional coordination 
between the line departments at the division, district, and tehsil levels, lead to 
inefficiency and corruption, and are the root causes of the crisis of 
governance at the grass root level. This crisis appears to have been 
addressed through over-concentration of authority, particularly in the office of 
the Deputy Commissioner, which besides creating the potential for abuse of 
authority, diffuses operational focus and results in the expedient handling of 
routine functions through crisis management”. 
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10 Local Government Plan, 2000, National Reconstruction Bureau, Government of Pakistan. 
 3.4. Consequently, the Plan proposed to address these issues by introducing a 
model described as 5Ds which is explained by the following diagram: 
 
Source: NRB   Figure 1 
 
3.5. The Local Government Ordinances promulgated by the provincial 
governments in August 200111 as per the model ordinance drafted by the 
NRB, embodies the practical aspects of this model. According to the Plan, 
“the system is designed to ensure that the genuine interests of the people are 
served and their rights safeguarded through an enabling environment, 
people’s participation, clear administrative responsibilities without political 
interference and making it answerable to the elected head of the district. At 
the same time it promises checks and balances to safeguard against abuse 
of authority”. 
  
3.6. More specific objectives of changing the system have been given by NRB as 
follows:12 1) Restructure the bureaucratic set up and de-centralize the 
administrative authority to the district level and below. 2) Re-orientate 
administrative systems to allow public participation in decision- making. 3) 
Facilitate monitoring of government functionaries by the monitoring 
committees of the local councils. Rationalize administrative structures for 
                                                 
11 Sindh/Balochistan/North West Frontier/Punjab Local Government Ordinance 2001 
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 improving efficiency. 4) Introduce performance incentive systems to reward 
efficient officials. 5) Ensure functioning of the related offices in an integrated 
manner to achieve synergistic effect and improve service delivery. 6) 
Eliminate delays in decision-making and disposal of business through 
enhanced administrative and financial authority of district and tehsil level 
officers. 7) Improve administrative and financial management practices in the 
district and management controls over operational units. 8) Redress 
grievances of people against maladministration through the office of Zila 
Mohtasib. The government functionaries will also be eligible to lodge 
complaints against the unlawful and motivated orders of the elected officials. 
9) Enable the proactive elements of society to participate in community work 
and development related activities. 
 
3.7. In accordance with the plan, elections for the new local government setup 
were held during December 2000 and September 2001. The Local 
Government Ordinance was promulgated in August 2001. Following are 
some of the features of the new local government system: 
 
3.7.1. Removal of the district administration system, one of the last holdouts 
of the colonial order and creation of three countrywide levels of 
governments i.e. districts (Zila Councils headed by Zila Nazim), tehsils 
(taluqa in Sindh and town in City Governments, headed by Tehsil 
Nazim), and union councils (headed by Union Nazim). 
3.7.2. Placing locally elected leaders in charge of out-posted bureaucrats 
3.7.3. Reserving of one-third of seats for women and other marginalized 
groups like peasants, workers etc. 
3.7.4. Providing local councils with the right to obtain information on 
departmental operations and to sanction non-performance 
3.7.5. Allowing properly registered citizen groups to gain direct access to a 
proportion of the local councils’ development budgets 
3.7.6. Creating a ‘municipal’ entity responsible for maintenance and 
development of basic municipal services such as water, sanitation, 
streets, lighting, parks, and business regulation. 
3.7.7. Distribution of financial resources to local governments through formula 
based provincial fiscal transfers and decentralization of specified 
taxation powers to enable local governments to effect credible 
development and service delivery. 
3.7.8. Creation of city governments in the provincial capitals with the 
possibility of allowing others to join later 
3.7.9. The division as an administrative tier will cease to exist. 
3.7.10. The institution of Citizen Community Boards has been created to 
enable the proactive elements of society to participate in community 
work and development related activities in both rural and urban areas. 
3.7.11. For an overview of the distribution of functions and basic structure of 
the set-up, please see the table and diagram below. 
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Source: NRB     Figure 2 
 
 
 
Responsibilities of Districts, Tehsil/Talukas & Union Councils13 
 
Responsibility District/Zila Tehsil/Taluka Union Council 
Education Primary & 
Secondary 
Education, Literacy
X X 
Health Dispensaries & 
Local Hospitals  
X X 
Roads District Roads Local Roads & 
streets 
Local Streets 
Water X Water Supply 
System 
Wells & Ponds 
Sewers & 
Sanitation 
X Yes X 
Fire Services X Yes X 
Parks & 
Playgrounds 
X Yes Yes 
Animals X Slaughterhouses, 
Fairs 
Cattle Ponds & 
Grazing Areas 
Cultural & Sports 
Services 
X Fairs, Cultural 
Events 
Libraries 
Street Services X Street Lighting, 
Signals 
Street Lighting 
Table 01 
Key: “X” indicates no direct spending responsibilities,; “Yes” indicates spending 
responsibility in City Districts, the Districts share some urban responsibilities normally 
exercised by Tehsil/Taluka with the Towns. 
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 4. Political structures & system 
 
Decentralization Indicators: Political   
Indicators  Macro (National) Sector 
Political 
Decentralization  
 Elected intermediate and local 
governments 
 Multi-party national, intermediate, 
and local government elections 
 Secret ballot in national, 
intermediate, and local elections 
 Elections held at regular intervals 
 Elections free and fair 
 Impartiality of the Judiciary 
 Independence of Central Bank 
 Importance of elected bodies in 
sector policy formulation 
 Importance of elected bodies in 
decisions about levels of sector 
funding  
 Importance of elected bodies in 
sector service delivery 
Source: World Bank, Decentralization Assessment Module, Rural Development Dept  
Box 1 
 
4.1. Local governments are formed at three levels: District, Tehsil, and Union. 
Each level comprises of its Nazim and Naib Nazim, its elected body (Zila 
Tehsil & Union Councils), and its administrative structures (District, 
Tehsil/Town Municipal and Union Administration). As of August 2002, the 
position is as under: 
 
Districts & Tehsils/Talukas14 
 
Provinces Districts City 
Districts 
Total Tehsils/ 
Talukas 
City 
Towns 
Total 
Punjab 33 1 34 116 6 122 
Sindh 15 1 16 86 18 104 
Balochistan 21 1 22 71 2 73 
NWFP 23 1 24 34 4 38 
Total 92 4 96 307 30 337 
Table 02 
 
(This structure presently covers all Pakistan except for Islamabad Capital 
Territory, FATA and Cantonments, which will become towns and part of the 
relevant Districts)  
 
4.2. The elections at the Union level constitute the backbone of the entire Local 
Government political system and structure. It is the one and the only level 
where all elections are direct. The direct elections in a Union constitute not 
only the Union Council but also bring into being directly elected Zila and 
Tehsil Councils through the Union Nazims and Naib Union Nazims 
respectively. Councillors, Nazims and Naib Nazims from all the union 
councils of a District elect the District Nazim and Naib Nazim as joint 
candidates. Similarly this electoral college will elect peasants (5%)/laborers, 
women (33%) and minority candidates. An example may be seen in box 1 
below. Seats are reserved for women, peasant/workers and minorities. The 
composition of various councils may be seen in table 3 below. The life of 
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 these Councils is three years. The elections are to be held on non-party 
basis and the criteria for being a councilor is: 
 
4.2.1. Minimum age 25 Years 
4.2.2. Citizen residing in the relevant ward 
4.2.3. Good Muslim Character (except for non-Muslims) 
4.2.4. Not convicted 
4.2.5. Not employee of Federal, Provincial or Local Governments 
4.2.6. Minimum qualification Matriculation or Secondary School Certificate for 
Nazims and Naib Nazims 
 
Composition of Union, Tehsil/Taluka & Zila Councils 
 
Council Number of 
Members 
Details of Members 
Union 21 Nazim, Naib Nazim, 12 Muslim Members 
Including 4 Women, 6 Peasants including 2 
Women, 1 Minority Member 
Tehsil/Taluka
Zila 
Union Council Nazims & Naib Nazims plus 33% of the 
number of Union Councils as women councilors & 5% 
each for peasants & minorities 
Table 03 
Note: The Union Council ‘s councilors are the Electoral College for the Zila, 
Tehsil/Taluka councilors at large and for the Nazim and Naib Nazims of these 
bodies none of which can be Union Council Councilors. Nazim and Naib 
Nazim run on a joint ticket.  
 
Numerical Example 15 
Local Government Elections 
 
Assume a district with 60 Union Councils (UC), Regrouped in three equal Tehsils/Talukas (20 
UCs per Tehsil/Taluka 
 
1. The electorate directly elects UC: 21 Councilors: of which 19 are elected at large. Also elected 
at large is one UC Nazim and one UC Naib Nazim on a joint ticket. 
2. By virtue of this direct election, The UC Naib Nazim, is also (concurrently) directly elected to 
the Tehsil/Taluka Council (TC) as Tehsil Councilor; 
3. Each of the three TCs is made up of one TC Nazim, one TC Naib Nazim, 20 UC Naib Nazims, 
and 9 additional councilors: 7 women councilors, 1 peasant/worker councilor and 1 minority 
councilor for a total of 31 members; 
4. The TC Nazim, the TC Naib Nazim and the additional 9 councilors are elected by 1260(21x60) 
UC councilors (thus of the 31, 20 of the councilors where directly elected by the people0 
5. The UC Nazim is also directly (and concurrently under step1) elected to the District or Zila 
Council (ZC) as ZC councilor; 
6. The ZC is thus made up of one Nazim, one Naib Nazim 60 UC Nazims and 26 additional 
councilors: 20 women councilors, 3 peasants and 3 minority councilors for a total of 88 
members. 
7. The ZC Nazim and Naib Nazim and the additional 26 councilors are elected by the 1260 UC 
councilors (thus of the 88 councilors, 60 are directly elected 
 
Box 2 
 
                                                 
15  Source: Charlton, Jackie et al, 2002 
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 4.3. It is generally believed that the elections were held in a free and fair manner. 
Some interesting observations need special mention before any issues are 
identified16.  
 79% of the councilor, comparing all kinds of reserved and general seats 
had not contested an election before and had entered for the first time in 
local government politics. 64% of them did not have any family members 
who had previously participated in the election. However, data varies 
when separated for each type of contested seats. The number reduces as 
57% for Nazim and 75% Naib Nazim who had not contested elections 
before. The multivariate analysis shows that 54%of candidates were 
those who themselves and their families had never contested in elections 
before.  
 The majority of councilors belonged to the younger strata of society. 
Around 74% of them are less than 46 years of age.  
 Another encouraging finding is that 79% of the councilors were literate 
while 10% of them were F.A and 16% of them were B.A and above. 
 Amongst the 21% of illiterate councilors, women constitute 69% of this 
category.  
 Occupational background of the elected councilors also showed a thin 
distribution of the councilors into twelve different occupational categories. 
However, the majority of Nazims/Naib Nazims belong to influential 
families while most of the councilors belong to low-income groups.  
 Due to the governments decision to hold the local government elections 
on a separate electorate basis, the majority of members of the minorities 
boycotted the elections leading to only 9% seats being contested for. 
  
4.4. The assessment of the level of understanding and knowledge of the 
Devolution of Power Plan reveals that the majority of voters as well as 
candidates did not know the basic features of the Plan17.  
 In rural areas 68% and in urban areas 54% respondents of voters groups 
did not know how to cast their vote. In response to specific questions on 
the union council elections such as the number of seats in the union 
council, the category of seats, the number of ballot papers, the definition 
of peasants and workers and the mode of elections for tehsil and district 
Nazim/Naib Nazim, the maximum number of rural women who claimed 
awareness about either of the aspects was around 20% and that of rural 
men was 50%.  
 While in urban areas, the maximum awareness for any aspect did not 
exceed 60%. Voters and candidates received information about the 
Devolution of Power Plan and election procedures from multiple sources. 
 Despite the high level of illiteracy, the main source of information for the 
candidates turned out to be Newspapers and TV for the voters.  
 Around 35% voters did not have Identity Cards, while 12% respondents 
did not have their names in the electoral rolls. However, there were 
gender and regional variations in this regard. A large number of 18 year 
olds who were allowed to cast their vote due to reduction in voting age 
                                                 
16  Pattan Development Organization, 2001 
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17  Pattan Development Organization, 2001 
 from 21 to 18, were not able to exercise their right due to non-possession 
of Identity Cards.  
 Inaccuracy of electoral rolls was the biggest problem on the Election Day.  
 
4.5. Women have been given 33 % of seats on the local bodies. These elections, 
for the first time in Pakistan’s history, brought in 36,187 women councilors 
under the local government system. They are expected to make a significant 
impact on allocation of resources, design and implementation of social 
policies. While it provides a tremendous opportunity for them to play an 
important role, it also poses a number of challenges. Ingrained habits and 
customs based on centuries of usage and some times active resentment 
from the male members of the councils tends to marginalize them. It has 
already been reported that the recommendations of male councilors are 
taken more seriously. Women feel uncomfortable participating in meetings 
and many have faced ridicule from their male colleagues. It has also been 
reported that the access to bureaucratic authorities is gender differentiated. 
Before they can become effective in their work they have to overcome the 
mundane problems of obtaining office space and separate toilets, which are 
non-existent. The councilors are not paid any remuneration. The women are 
particularly disadvantaged because they often do not have an independent 
source of income. Even when they are working, they tend to occupy low paid 
jobs. This is likely to effect or even may undermine their effective participation 
in the work of the councils. The underlying problem that impedes women’s 
participation in social decision-making is the mindset based on religious 
practices, customs, cultural requisites and plane ignorance. This mindset 
results into an institutional inertia in male dominated institutions to implement 
changes in gender policies. Another important challenge stems from the fact 
that the women in general and those elected to local bodies lack skills to be 
effective in their role as councilors. Therefore at this stage, reservation of 
seats for women in the local bodies remains a necessary, but not a sufficient 
condition for effective participation and promotion of gender equality18. 
 
4.6. A survey has compiled the problems faced by the elected women councilors. 
During provincial visits by the author, many of the findings were reconfirmed 
during interviews and observations. A summary is presented in the following 
table: 
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18 Nasir Islam, Local Level Governance: Devolution & Democracy in Pakistan, University of Ottawa, April 
2002 
 4.7.  
 
Ranking of Various Problems Faced by the Women Councilors  
Ranking Problem 
1 Lack of funds for development work 
2 Lack of power 
3 Lack of information / knowledge 
4 Lack of experience and skills 
5 Lack of money to attend council session and other meeting 
6 Lack of transport facilities in my area 
7 Lack of proper roads etc. 
8 Domestic work 
9 Children 
10 Lack of confidence 
11 Discouraging attitude of male councilors 
12 Discouraging attitude of community / biradari (clan) 
13 Discouraging attitude of Nazim and Naib Nazim 
14 Economic Activities/Job 
15 Family Pressure 
Source: Pattan Development Organization, 2001 Table 4 
 
4.8. Issues 
 
Decentralization Dimension 
DEFINING THE DIMENSIONS OF DECENTRALIZATION 
Decentralization 
Dimension  
Definition  Decentralization Dimension In The Context 
of Pakistan  
Political 
Decentralization  
Transfers policy and 
legislative powers from 
central governments to 
autonomous, subnational 
assemblies and local 
councils that have been 
democratically elected by 
their respective 
subnational 
constituencies. 
 Have district, Tehsil and Union Councils 
been elected under a democratic, 
constituency-based, free and fair electoral 
process?  
 Are Councils constitutionally recognized as 
levels of government? 
 Do they have a clearly assigned roles and 
functions vis à vis other levels? 
 Can Councils set policy within their 
jurisdictions—do their resolutions have 
legal weight? 
Source: Adopted by author from Overview of Decentralization in India, World Bank, 2000 
Box 3 
 
4.8.1. It would be safe to conclude that political decentralization was fairly 
complete by various standards. Not only local councils were 
established through phased elections but substantial mandates were 
also transferred to them. Following issues have been identified in the 
set-up and its implementation in Pakistan. 
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4.8.2. Role & Responsibilities: There is no clarity about the roles and 
responsibilities of Union, Tehsil/Taluka and District Level councilors 
and governments. After having elected the district/Tehsil Nazims the 
councillors are feeling redundant, pressure of public expectations, 
 seeing no effective role for themselves is giving rise to frustration that 
is being expressed through motions of no confidence against Nazims 
and Naib-Nazims. 
 
4.8.3. Capacity: The councilors elected lack knowledge, experience, and 
skill to understand and work under the new system. Capacity has 
emerged as one of the very important constraints on the functioning of 
the system. 
 
4.8.4. Social Setup: The prevailing social setup of communities based 
on cast, tribes and families is the basic element of non-cooperation 
between the elected members of local government. At the same time, 
the expectations have been raised from the political set-up. This was 
aggravated by the fact that the elections were also seen as first step 
towards restoration of democracy in Pakistan under the military 
government. 
 
4.8.5. Continuity: The question of continuity of system looms large in the 
minds of the elected representatives specially given the history of local 
governments in Pakistan and move towards restoration of national and 
provincial legislatures. This environment is not conducive for smooth 
running of the local governments. 
 
4.8.6. Constraints to Work: Most of the elected councilors belong to blue-
collar class and the delays in getting the travel allowance and stipend 
creates problems. One may argue that councilors are fixing high 
expectations from the system but the fact remains that no orientation 
has been given to them on what to expect. At the same time, not much 
thought has been given to the arrangements that would enable the 
elected representatives to work with ease. 
 
4.8.7. Relationship between Three Tiers of Local Government: There is 
ambiguity in demarcation of roles between the three tiers of local 
government and distribution of development funds, which is creating 
confusion among the councilors thus leading to constrained 
relationships. Although the administration directly reports to the 
Councilors, many of them complain of helplessness in dealing with the 
bureaucracy. 
 
4.8.8. Relationship between Local, National & Provincial Governments: 
With the arrival of elected national & provincial governments, the 
civilian government has announced development funds for the 
respective members without any consideration to the district 
governments. This is being viewed as interference in the local 
government system and has obviously created resentment for the local 
governments. An institution called the Local Government Commission 
(LGC) is to be established at provincial level as an oversight committee 
for the LGO. The purpose of the LGC will be the resolution of disputes 
between districts, between provincial departments and district 
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 governments, or between District Nazims and District Ombudsman. 
However, these bodies have been established very late (2003) and 
have not performed the designated feature as yet. 
 
4.8.9. Relationship between Councilors & Member Provincial 
Assemblies:  The councilors especially at Union and Tehsil/Taluka 
level are under influence of MPA’s which results in defeating the 
purpose of grass roots approach. 
 
4.8.10. Political Affiliations: Local Government Elections were 
held on non-party basis but the councilors elected have political 
affiliations and rivalry among the parties hampers the progress. 
 
4.8.11. Qualification Disjoint: There is a qualification disjoint between 
the literate and illiterate members, which hampers in smooth 
implementation of new system.  
 
4.8.12. It is increasingly evident that reservation of seats for Women 
alone is having little impact. Women Councilors complain about non-
cooperation of Nazims and Naib Nazims in-connection with the release 
of funds, honorarium and traveling allowance. Another issue is the 
training of women councilors, which is very much required given their 
unprecedented number and expectations of their roles. Some 
programs have been started for the purpose but they don’t seem to be 
considering the diversity among the women councilors (79% first 
timers, 53% illiterate).  
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 5. Administrative structures & systems 
 
Decentralization Indicators: Administrative   
Indicators  Macro (National) Sector 
Administrative 
Decentralization 
 Location of smallest 
management unit for sector 
service delivery 
 Level of government responsible 
for conditions of service of civil 
servants in the smallest 
management unit 
 Location of smallest 
management unit for rural sector 
service delivery 
 Level of government responsible 
for conditions of service of civil 
servants in the smallest 
management unit 
Source: World Bank, Decentralization Assessment Module, Rural Development Dept. 
Box 4 
 
5.1. In accordance with the political structure of the local government, an 
administrative structure has been proposed at all three main levels of the 
government namely, District, Tehsil/Taluka and Union. The district 
administration is co-ordinated by a District Co-ordination Officers (DCO), and 
consists of up to twelve groups which are headed by the Executive District 
Officers (EDOs). District officers are in charge of sub-offices at the District 
Headquarter; While Deputy District Officers co-ordinate the work of the sub-
offices.  
 
Administrative Structure at District Level 
 
Source: NRB     Figure 3 
 
5.2. The Tehsil Nazim is the executive head of the Tehsil Government, while the 
Naib Tehsil Nazim acts as the convener of the Tehsil Council. Under the 
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 Nazim there is a Tehsil Municipal Officer (TMO). There are four Tehsil 
Officers  (TO’s) reporting to the TMO (Tehsil municipal officer), for 1.Finance, 
Budget and account 2. Municipal Standards and co-ordination, 3. Land Use 
Control 4. Rural-Urban Planning. 
  
5.3. The Union Council has up to three secretaries (Secretary Union Committees, 
Secretary Municipal Functions and Secretary Community Development) who 
are under the executive control of the Union Nazim.  
 
 
 
Figure 4 
Source: Pattan Development Organization, 2001 
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5.4. Local Government staff consists of both Federal and Provincial cadres, which 
remain their employer till the date of their retirement and also pay their 
pension. All civil servants move around both geographically and functionally 
during their service period. These movements are the result of decisions by 
their superiors but are usually linked to promotions or to postings to more 
desirable areas. As will be seen later, many of the issues stem from this vary 
reason. 
 
5.5. The Federal and Provincial civil servants were 2,120,300 in the year of 
introduction of Decentralization/Devolution Plan i.e. 2000. Out of these 21% 
(440,300) were federal and remaining 79% (1,680,000) provincial civil 
servants, 42% of whom were primary school teachers. With devolution many 
of the provincial posts were transferred to the districts. With 
Decentralization/Devolution the civil servants changed employers but not 
locations. 
 
5.6. The “District Coordinating Officer” (DCO) has replaced the former Deputy 
Commissioner (DC) and as a result of decentralization /devolution of power 
reports to an elected person i.e. District or Zila Nazim. Under the new system 
many legal powers of DCO’s have been curtailed which also include control 
on police. The DCO is the Accounting Officer for the District thus has 
significant executive and managerial responsibilities. The majority of DCOs 
belong to the District management Group of Federal Civil Services. They are 
posted by the provincial governments without consultation or right of refusal 
of the Nazims. Nazim can request the transfer of the DCOs, however subject 
to certain conditions.  
 
5.7. Executive District Officers (EDOs) are responsible for various sectors e.g. 
education, health or literacy. The key change in the new system is that these 
EDOs now report to the DCO and not to the line ministries like in the former 
divisional/provincial hierarchy. However their parent provincial departments 
post them which, as will be seen later, are giving rise to a multitude of 
problems.  
 
5.8. Under Decentralization/Devolution the district staffs remained to be provincial 
civil servants and for the first year were directly paid by the provincial 
governments. 
 
5.9. Tehsil/Taluka Councils are staffed in entirely different manner. Many 
Tehsils/Talukas were successor bodies to the former Municipal Corporations, 
so they   inherited the staff and organizational structures of these local bodies 
as well as their financial resource base. Provincial departments have also 
been posting staff to Tehsils/Talukas.  
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5.10. Issues: 
 
Decentralization Dimension 
DEFINING THE DIMENSIONS OF DECENTRALIZATION 
Decentralization 
Dimension  
Definition  Decentralization Dimension In The Context 
of Pakistan  
Administrative 
Decentralization 
Places planning and 
implementation 
responsibilities in the 
hands of locally situated 
civil servants. It takes 
three main forms, 
deconcentration, 
delegation, and devolution 
(1) Deconcentration 
disperses staff of higher 
level governments into 
local areas by establishing 
field offices. (2) 
Devolution, the strongest 
form of administrative 
decentralization, places 
local staff under the 
jurisdiction of elected local 
governments. (3) in 
delegation, administrative 
powers and 
responsibilities for public 
services are transferred to 
semi-autonomous bodies 
which are ultimately 
accountable to the tier that 
delegated the powers. 
 How many major functions have been 
formally devolved to Councils? 
 Do civil servants and technical/ancillary 
staff working within the districts, Tehsils 
and Unions report to Councils at their 
respective levels?  
 Do Councils have administrative or 
technical control over programs 
administered locally?  
 Can Councils hire, fire, discipline, promote, 
or transfer technical or non-technical staff 
without first receiving permission from an 
outside (usually higher) authority?  
 Do Councils have their own technical staff? 
 Do Councils write or provide substantive 
input into the Annual Confidential Reports 
(ACRs) of technical staff working within the 
Council areas? 
Source: Adopted by author from Overview of Decentralization in India, World Bank, 2000 
Box 5 
 
5.10.1. Overall, administrative decentralization is a week part of the 
local government set-up in Pakistan. Local decision-making mostly 
remains in the hands of bureaucracy, despite they being responsible to 
the elected representatives and capacity issues. Sectoral 
decentralization is also weak. Some of the other issues are explained 
below.  
 
5.10.2. Working with Elected Representatives: It’s for the first time in 
the history of Pakistan that there has been substantial effort to make 
the bureaucracy work under elected representatives. This has created 
lot of frustration in the ranks of civil servants. There is a lack of 
understanding between the Nazims and civil servants, which is 
hampering the smooth working in the district. 
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5.10.3. Unclear coordination & multiple reporting channels: As 
reported earlier, majority of the supervisory level positions are still 
manned by the provincial and federal cadres. What this means in 
practice is that the employees are made responsible functionally at the 
 district level but also report to the provincial departments. This 
duplication in the chain of command has led to many problems in the 
way things are managed. It’s because of this factor that many DCOs 
are facing problems in administrative matters in-connection with the 
EDOs of different sectors.   
 
5.10.4. Personnel issues: The district governments are not allowed, in 
most of the cases, hire, fire or transfer of the employees. This is single 
most important issue in the administrative decentralization in Pakistan. 
It has resulted in uncertainty of management at various levels of local 
government. Postings and transfers of government functionaries have 
become a major source of conflict between the provincial governments 
and the district governments, and within the district governments 
between various tiers as well as between the political and civil arm of 
the district government. This conflict is delaying implementation, 
utilization of resources and affecting the quality of administration19. 
 
5.10.5. Establishment of New Departments & Structures: 
Decentralization has created quite a few new departments and 
structures across the board and without any consideration to the size, 
location of the district. This has resulted in false expectations, problems 
in implementation and unnecessary pressure due to thin spreading of 
resources. In addition there are so many structures, which may be 
good if established where required but have not been established as 
per the LGO. These include various monitoring committees, village 
councils, district ombudsman, district insaaf (justice) committees, 
reconciliation committees to name a few.   
 
5.10.6. Capacity: The new system has led to the creation of new 
structures (departments), systems (rules/procedures), functions and 
relationships. This obviously requires investment of time and resources 
to build the skill mix at the lower levels. Capacity is emerging as an 
important limiting factor in the local government set-up specially 
relating to finance, audit & account and planning functions. 
 
5.10.7. Shortcomings in Smooth Transition: The erstwhile position of 
the Deputy Commissioner (DC) at the district level stemmed from a 
number of laws and statutes. While the old position has been done 
away with by a stroke, numerous statutes/laws remain un-conferred, 
which has left a power vacuum and hampered smooth transition of 
powers. 
 
5.10.8. Law & Order: With Police coming directly under Nazim, 
administrative structure feels left out and DCO complain about the use 
of police by Nazims. Ironically, the Nazims complain of absolutely 
having no control over police.    
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 6. Fiscal structures & systems 
 
Decentralization Indicators: Fiscal   
Indicators  Macro (National) Sector 
Fiscal 
Decentralization 
 Share of revenues retained 
and internally generated by 
intermediate governments 
 Share of aggregate public 
expenditures over which 
intermediate governments 
have effective control 
 Share of aggregate public 
expenditures over which local 
governments have effective 
control. 
 Level of government that pays 
salaries of staff of smallest unit  
 Share of sector expenditures of 
smallest administrative unit derived 
from budgets of local governments 
 Share of sector expenditures of 
smallest unit, which is derived from 
user charges and other beneficiary 
cost recovery schemes.  
 Level of government that determines 
the budget of the smallest sector unit 
Source: World Bank, Decentralization Assessment Module, Rural Development Dept 
Box 6 
 
6.1. Fiscal structures and systems take into account the expenditure and revenue 
assignments and the structuring of intergovernmental relations surrounding 
theses. This section accordingly looks at these components in the context of 
decentralization in Pakistan. 
6.2. Public finances in Pakistan have been characterized by high fiscal deficits, 
poor revenue mobilization, a persistent trend of centralization, massive 
vertical imbalances between federal and provincial governments (i.e. very 
large gaps between provincial governments’ expenditures and own revenues, 
which have to be made up by means of fiscal transfers from the federal 
government), weak financial management and lack of accountability of the 
public sector.20  Local governments have not been recognized by the 
constitution as a separate tier of government and existed only as extensions 
of the provinces with some functions delegated to them by the provinces. 
This has seriously affected the fiscal structure and related distribution of 
authority for revenue mobilization and expenditure obligations among 
different levels of government. The LG Plan 2000 recognizes the problems 
associated with the system by stating that “the transfer and grant system has 
been weak. There is no formula for distribution of funds to districts and 
provincial budgets do not specify district expenditures. Districts do not know, 
with certainty, what they will expect from the provincial departments, which 
affects planning negatively. This results in political machinations, ad- hocism, 
and lack of transparency”.  
6.3. Main source for provincial revenues has been transfer based as a share of 
federal tax collections. The decision on the list of taxes to be shared (divisible 
pool), the ratio of the provincial/federal share of the pool, and the formula for 
its distribution to the provinces is to be fixed at least once every five years by 
the National Finance Commission (NFC). The divisible pool in 2001-2202 
was about Rs.460 billion, made up of income tax, sales tax, revenues from 
customs, federal excises, wealth and capital value taxes. In addition various 
federally ceded taxes are returned to the provinces by the federal 
government on derivation basis net of a 2% federal collection charge; this 
includes royalties on petroleum and natural gas, surcharges etc. The current 
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20 Reforming provincial finances in the context of devolution, World Bank, 2000 
 NFC Award, which was announced in 1997and implemented with the 1997-
98 budget brought some major changes in the formula and modalities for 
revenue sharing between the federal and provincial governments.  
6.4. Under the new system the divisible pool of tax revenues has been expanded 
to incorporate all federally collected taxes. As against the previous Award, 
which allocated 80% of net receipts of taxes in the divisible pool to the four 
provinces, the new formula allocates 37.5% of the enlarged divisible pool to 
the provinces. The 1997 AWARD is under review; until the new Award is 
made and will be the bases for the allocation for 2002-2003.  
6.5. Let us see the mechanisms and changes proposed to address these 
problems in the new local government system. 
 
6.6. Expenditure assignments 
 
6.6.1. A stable and meaningful decentralization requires an unambiguous and 
well-defined institutional framework in the assignment of expenditure 
responsibilities among the different levels of government. This is by no 
means the only condition, but it is the most important. For example it is 
also necessary to have sufficient budgetary autonomy to carry out the 
assigned responsibilities at each level of government.  
6.6.2. According to the local government ordinance, the administrative and 
financial authority for the management of the offices of the Government 
specified in Part-A of the First Schedule of the Ordinance set up in a 
district shall stand decentralized to the District Government of that 
district: 
 Provided that where there is no office of the Government in a 
district specified in Part-A of the First Schedule and the 
Government sets up an office on a subsequent date, such office 
shall be decentralized to the District Government from that date: 
 Where in a district, there is no office specified in Part-B of the First 
Schedule, the Government shall set up such offices and post 
officers and staff in such offices. 
6.6.3. The offices decentralized to the District Governments and offices set 
up by the Government shall be grouped in various groups specified in 
Part-C of the First Schedule: 
 Provided that the Government may, for the reason of non-
existence of any office or offices specified in the First Schedule in 
a district, in consultation with the District Government of such 
district, vary or amalgamate the grouping of offices for efficiency 
and effectiveness by notification in the official Gazette: Provided 
further that the number of groups of offices shall not exceed the 
number of groups specified in Part-C of the First Schedule. 
6.6.4. Similarly, the administrative and financial management of the offices of 
Local Government and Rural Development Department, Public Health 
Engineering Department and Housing and Physical Planning Department 
which were providing services at the regional, zonal, circle, divisional, 
district and tehsil levels shall stand entrusted to respective Tehsil 
Municipal Administration or Town Municipal Administration, as the case 
may be, alongwith the employees working in such offices: 
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  Provided that the Government may direct for retention of certain 
components of Housing and Physical Planning Department with 
the District Government alongwith the officers and members of 
staff working therein. 
6.6.5.  The decentralized offices are listed in Appendix - 4. A cursory look at 
the decentralized offices will reveal that virtually all social services and a 
major component of economic and community services, which have been 
the responsibility of provincial governments. In addition many new 
functions have also been created like information technology. 
 
6.7. Revenue Assignments 
 
6.7.1. The Local Government Plan acknowledges the importance of 
resources for the local governments in the following words: 
 
“The principle of the formula for provincial to district transfers is that 
district and local government should generate their own resources to 
the extent possible. Incentives should always encourage financial self-
sufficiency to the extent possible at each level. However, the current 
quantum of funds being used by the provinces will ensure the working 
of the district administration and the political system. Untangling 
provincial finances and simplifying funding processes and the financial 
plumbing will result in increased efficiency”. 
 
6.7.2. Accordingly, it lists out taxes, which may be levied by various levels of 
the local government in the second schedule of the local government 
ordinance. The list may be seen as Appendix – 5.  
6.7.3. The Constitutional amendments of 14th July 2002 propose to modify 
the allocation of taxes between the federal and provincial governments 
so as to allow the provinces to meet at least 40% of their revenue 
needs from their own revenue; this would be accomplished by the 
transfer of one buoyant tax to each of the provincial and local 
governments levels. The revenue assigned to the provinces is 
distributed among them on the basis of their respective populations 
according to the 1981 Census.  
 
6.8. Other Structures & Processes: 
6.8.1. Provincial Finance Commissions: The Devolution Plan envisages the 
setting up of Provincial Finance Commission (PFC) in each province to 
decide on the nature of fiscal relations between provincial and local 
governments. This body is expected to play a similar role as the 
National Finance Commission (NFC), which is constitutionally 
mandated (as per clause 160) to decide the distribution of revenues 
between the federation and the provinces. It is also significant to note 
that the Devolution Plan envisages transfers from provincial to District 
Governments only. Lower levels of local government like Tehsil/Taluka 
councils and Union Councils will receive whatever funds are required to 
execute their functions from the District Government and not directly 
from the provincial governments. 
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 6.8.2. Provincial Finance Commissions replaced provincial Finance 
Committees in May 2002. They each made an interim award for 2002-
2003 in June 2002. Table 5 below describes the total resources 
available to the provinces, their main sources and uses and the amount 
made available to the districts while Table 6 presents the horizontal 
distribution keys. 
 
Vertical Distribution Keys of Four Provinces for 2002-2003 
(Amount In Pak. Rs.) 
Item 
Examined/ 
Provinces 
Balochistan NWFP Punjab Sindh 
Total Current 
Resources 
Revenue Receipts; 
26,434,565,000 
Revenue Receipts: 
46,767,127,000* 
Revenue Receipts: 
131,226,826,000 
Revenue Receipts: 
84,901,334,887 
Sources of 
Revenue 
Federal:  
24,896,274,000  
Main Items are: 
NFC: 8,439,259,000 
Subvention: 
5,236,990,000 
Gas Surcharge; 
6,735,540,000 
Excise/Royalty on  
Oil & Gas:  
3,309,636,000 
Provincial: 
1,538,291,000 
(5.8% of Total) 
Federal:  
43,102,461,000  
Main Items are: 
NFC: 21,559,919,000 
Hydel Profits; 
15,904,000,000 
(In Budget / 
6,000,000,000 for 
PFC) 
Subvention: 
3,898,002,000 
Provincial: 
3,664,666,000 
(7.9% of Total) 
Federal:  
108,715,292,000  
Main Items are: 
NFC: 85,200,873,000 
Straight Transfers: 
5,552,298,000 
2.5% GST 
17,962,121,000 
Federal:  
66,916,290,000  
Main Items are: 
NFC: 37,069,000,000 
Straight Transfers: 
18,847,000,000 
2.5% GST 
10,000,000 
Provincial: 
11,985,044,000 
(14.1% of Total) 
IDA 
6,000,000,000 
Distribution 
Key 
- 31% of divisible pools 
to Districts, that is 
7,240,000,000 
-100% of 2.5%pointsof 
GST revenues to 
District development 
-Development fund to 
be shared with each 
District as follows: 
40% for District, 25% for 
Tehsil/Taluka, 35% for 
Union Council 
 
- Provincial Pool 
minus 
16,361,000,000 (Debt 
servicing & 
repayment + 
Pension+ Subsidy+ 
GP Fund &Pensions+ 
Governor, Assembly 
& High Court)= 
Divisible Pool 
19,334,576,000 
- 60% of divisible 
pool to Districts 
(provincial allocable 
11,600,746,000 
- Development fund 
to be shared with 
each District as 
follows: 
60% for District, 30% 
for Tehsil/Taluka (On 
the basis of # of UCs 
if more than one 
Tehsil/Taluka), 10% 
for Union Council 
(Equally) 
 
 
Provincial Pool is 
defined as Resources 
(IDA excluded) Minus 
Debt servicing – 
Pensions, Subsidies & 
Charged Expenditures 
- 38.74% 
(51,576,000,000) of total 
Provincial Consolidated 
Fund (Divisible Pool is 
the District Share 
includes Development & 
2.5% Points of GST), 
Current Expenditures 
are set at 
42,576,000,000 
- Development 
Expenditures were set 
at 9,000,000,000 out of 
15,480,000,000 
Allocable (IDA 
Excluded)  
- Development Funds to 
shared at Districts 75% 
to Districts (85% in 
Lahore) 25% to Tehsils 
(15% in Lahore) 
Distribution in a Tehsil in 
a District is based on 
population 
- The current 
expenditure divisible 
pool is defined as: 
NFC+ Straight 
Transfers+ Provincial 
Taxes (8,315,000,000); 
- 40% of this 
64,231,000,000 is the 
District share provincial 
allocable amount 
25,692,410,000; 
- The development 
divisible pool was set at 
5,510,000,000 starting 
with a 7,000,000,000 
budget and reserving 
amounts for counterpart 
funding and 5% for 
helping Districts 
disadvantaged by the 
Horizontal Distribution 
Formula (290,000,000) 
Table- 05 
Source: Charlton, Jackie et al, 2002 
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 Horizontal Distribution Keys- Four Provinces 2002-2003 
(Amount in Pak. Rs.) 
 Baluchistan NWFP Punjab Sindh 
Current 
Transfers 
Same 
distribution 
between Districts 
as the 2001-
2002 distribution, 
which was based 
on historical 
spending 
patterns 
- Salaries are covered 
on the basis of 94% ( 
to account for 
vacancies) of the 
establishment costs 
- Non salaries are 
funded for 90% 
according to a 
formula with three 
factors: 
• Population 
50% 
• Backwardness 
25% 
• Lag in 
Infrastructure 25% 
• The remaining 
10% is distributed 
to cover the 
difference between 
past expenditures 
and the formula 
grant (this is called 
fiscal equalization) 
Distributed according to the 
demands of the Districts 
and TMAs: No Formula 
 
A Formula will be prepared 
for the final Award in 
September 2002. Five 
indicators may be used: 
• Population 
• Underdevelopment 
• Performance in 
reducing current 
expenditures 
• Share of 
Development outlays in 
budget 
• % of expenditures 
covered by own 
resources 
 
Distributed according to 
four factors: 
• Population 50% 
• Backwardness 
17.5% 
• Tax Collections 
7.5% 
• Transitional 
25% 
Development 
Transfers 
Distributed 
according to two 
factors. Share of: 
- Population 50% 
- Area 50% 
Same Formula as 
above 
Distributed according to 
2two factors: 
• Population 67% 
• Underdevelopment 
33% 
Distributed according to 
four factors: 
• Population 50% 
• Backwardness 30% 
• Equal Per District 
10% 
• Backlog 10% 
2.5% Points 
of GST 
See 
Development 
Transfers 
Amount of existing 
Octroi /Zila Tax grant 
to be transferred to 
Tehsil (Octroi) and 
Union Council (Zila) 
minus 10% for 
Districts. Excess 
amount of 2.5%points 
of GST to e 
transferred according 
to the current 
spending formula 
- Current amount of 
transfers to be maintained 
(6,162,000,000) 
- Reminder of 800,000,000 
to be distributed as follows 
• 300,000,000 to UC 
• 200-300 million to 
be distributed to 
financially weak Tehsils 
• Reminder to be 
allocated in final award 
• 6,500,000,000 
to be distributed on 
the basis of past 
Octroi/Zila Tax 
collection; 
• 2,800,000,000 
to be used as 
replacement for KPP 
and distributed on the 
basis of population 
(70%) and 
backwardness (30%); 
30% of this amount 
goes to Talukas 
• Residual 
(700,000,000) goes to 
smaller Districts on the 
basis of backwardness 
Table- 06 
Source: Charlton, Jackie et al, 2002 
 
6.8.3. District budgets for 2001-2002 were prepared using line ministry 
information on past budgets and information from Accountant General 
on spending in each district. Until then, Finance department was not 
involved in allocating current spending across districts. Formulas were 
used by some line departments to make these allocations. The 
Budgets of 2001-2002 prepared by the provincial finance departments 
had to be approved by the Zila Councils. These approvals led to 
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 demands for more resources, which were met in some cases. The 
provincial finance departments also prepared some components of the 
district budgets for fiscal year 2002-03. 
 
6.9.  Issues 
 
Decentralization Dimension 
DEFINING THE DIMENSIONS OF DECENTRALIZATION 
Decentralization 
Dimension  
Definition  Decentralization Dimension In The Context 
of Pakistan  
Fiscal 
Decentralization 
Accords substantial 
budget autonomy to 
intermediate and local 
governments. This 
autonomy includes the 
means to generate 
substantial revenues 
internally, and effective 
control of expenditures 
made with these revenues 
and with transfers from 
higher-level subnational 
governments and central 
government. 
 What is the degree of revenue autonomy of 
Councils—can they raise their own tax and 
non-tax revenues?  
 How dependent are Councils on fiscal 
transfers from Provincial governments? 
How much discretion do Councils have in 
expenditures—from own revenues as well 
as from transfers?  
 What share of transfers from higher levels 
are block or specific purpose grants?  
 Are Councils authorized to raise funds from 
other sources such as Banks?  
 Do Councils pay the salaries of local staff?  
 Is there a clear, transparent 
intergovernmental fiscal formula for 
transfers to each Council level?  
 What share of the development and non-
development budgets has been devolved to 
Councils? 
Source: Adopted by author from Overview of Decentralization in India, World Bank, 2000 
Box 7 
 
 
6.9.1. Dependency on Federal/Provincial transfers: Given the nature of 
public finances in Pakistan, the local governments are still dependent 
on the provincial and federal governments for many reasons. Till the 
time that the provincial governments keep on posting their employees 
to the local levels, this dependency is unlikely to change. In addition, 
provinces still exercised substantial control over the budget preparation 
process of the district governments.  
6.9.2. Delayed announcement of PFCs: There were considerable delays in 
establishment of PFC as anticipated in the local government ordinance. 
This caused lot of resentment and uncertainty and affected the budget 
formulation process as well. The institution of PFC is still in nascent 
stages and will require substantial assistance for it’s strengthening. The 
working of PFCs needs improvement, as there is shortage of staff for 
budgeting and implementation and the meeting of PFCs are not on 
regular bases. The interim awards are not finalized. Funds are not 
being transferred to the Local Governments directly on monthly basis in 
accordance with the Award. The PFCs are not holding regular 
meetings. 
6.9.3. Expenditure restrictions on districts: The districts have many 
restrictions especially in terms of personnel related expenditures. They 
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 are not authorized to hiring of required resources. However, the 
positive departure from the past is that they do not have to go back to 
the provincial governments for those projects where they have their 
own resources for funding them. But the districts, at present, do not 
have much maneuverability with the development budget as more than 
90% of the total budget still goes to non-development expenditures. 
The local government ordinance has provided for creation of so many 
new departments and services without giving enough thought to their 
requirements across the board or their budgetary needs. This has led 
to a situation where many of the envisioned structures could not be 
established. 
6.9.4. Revenues: There are many cases where there is a duplication of tax 
authority between the provinces and districts. Property tax is one such 
example. Overlapping tax bases or tax base sharing between different 
levels of government increases taxpayers’ complications and leads to 
spatial variation in effective tax rates, with associated distortions. It is 
further observed that the new taxes allowed to various levels of the 
district government are not buoyant enough to yield good returns. A 
major problem with regard to revenues is that many urban areas 
generate more revenues than rural or undeveloped areas. While part of 
this problem is addressed by the equalization grants from the provinces 
but still it leads to dependency of these areas further on the provinces. 
6.9.5. Audit & Accounting Issues: Many delays were reported in 
establishment of accounting/audit structures and posting of finance 
office staff. The accounts manual is not complete and notified at all 
levels of local government and no training has been given to the 
personnel dealing with the accounting under the new system. Pakistan 
had, with the assistance of World Bank, embarked on a program to 
reform the audit and accounting structures through a project called 
PIFRA. No system is in place for bridging the interface of PIFRA and 
the new system of accounting of the local governments. The offices of 
Accountant general of Pakistan have not carried out the certification of 
District accounts for the financial year 2001-2002. System is not in 
place for timely submission of audit reports and resolution of audit 
objections by the concerned officers. Due to these reasons, much of 
the budgets could not be utilized in time. 
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 7. Development planning & management 
 
7.1. Decentralization or devolution is not an end in itself. It is only a mean to 
achieve certain objectives, development by improving governance being the 
most important one. Despite an average growth in GDP of 6% per annum 
over many decades, Pakistan’s performance in the social sectors has lagged 
behind many countries in the region and elsewhere in the world. In early 
1990s, realizing the lagging behind of social sectors and their role in 
economic development, a Social Action Programme (SAP) was launched in 
collaboration with bilateral and multilateral donors. SAP was to take an 
integrated approach to four key social sectors - primary education, primary 
health, rural water supply and population welfare. They were chosen for 
being the most basic services needed by population and because of their 
obvious linkages and potential for synergy. Two phase of SAP have been 
completed with a mix of results but all falling short of achieving their 
objectives. 
  
7.2. Some of the shortcomings and reasons for failure are summarized below21: 
 
 Inefficiency and cost ineffectiveness in the provision of social services. 
 Lack of financial sustainability. 
 Centralization and lack of devolution. 
 Duplication and dichotomy. 
 Lake of accountability. 
 Misuse of discretionary powers. 
 Over staffing. 
 Selection by patronage. 
 Excessive transfers and absenteeism 
 Lack of community participation. 
 Lack of approved policies at provincial level. 
 Lack of inter-sectoral synergy. 
 Lake of monitoring and evaluation. 
 
7.3. Problems of development management relating to any social service in 
Pakistan comprises of two levels i.e. project planning and implementation 
and maintenance and quality improvement of built or existing facilities and 
services. Resource constraints at provincial level, which are historically 
entrusted with the delivery of social services but rely on the federal 
government for fiscal transfers, warrant, at least till the time that their 
resource position improves, federal projects and specially those funded by 
the donors. This left little room for the districts, the actual place for all action, 
to participate in the process of planning and management. For example, ADB 
is currently funding 4 projects in education sector, which will continue till 
2004, if the implementation remains smooth. Then there are upcoming 
projects included in the pipeline (e.g. DEEP, Sindh) for the education sector. 
On the government side, ESR related activities are all federally planned and 
supervised including resource transfers. All this entails continued interaction 
between federal government, provinces and districts in the realms of 
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21 Social Policy & Development Centre, Review of SAP, 1997,  
 planning, implementation and finances but little independence for the districts 
to determine their priorities. The second kind of intergovernmental and 
institutional arrangements revolve around maintenance of existing and newly 
established facilities in the district, mechanisms for increased community 
participation and related financial and personnel administration matters. 
 
7.4. One of the implied purposes of introducing the new local government system 
was to improve governance in its various dimensions in such a way as to 
address some or all of the problems identified above and lead towards better 
standards of living for the people. This section looks at some of the major 
mechanisms instituted in the local government plan for development and its 
various mechanisms and themes. 
  
7.5. The local government system aims to provide both systems and structures to 
provide enough authority to people to address challenges in development 
through political, administrative and fiscal decentralization. In addition, it also 
provides a mechanism for accountability that will create sufficient pressures 
on relevant powers to deliver.  
 
7.6. The development at the level of all tiers of local government is to be 
governed by the Citizen Community Boards (CCB). The CCB are designated 
agents of change and catalysts for activity.  This institution has been created 
to organize and enable proactive elements of the society to participate in 
community work and undertake development-related activities in both rural 
and urban areas following a bottom-up and participation based approaches.  
 
 
7.6.1. Need: In the previous system, administrative control as well as 
development planning was carried out through a centralized system.  It 
was essentially a top-down approach in which the people, for whose 
alleged benefit the development was being done, were conspicuous by 
their absence in the entire decision-making process.  By creating an 
enabling environment, the people are themselves involved in arranging 
and managing various kinds of social and developmental projects.  
7.6.2. Formation: In a local area, a group of non-elected citizens may set up a 
voluntary organization with the name of CCB. The creation of CCBs is 
formalized through registration. Unlike NGOs, which are registered under 
various laws; the CCBs are registered with the Community Development 
Office of the respective District under the Local Government Ordinance. 
The CCB has a general body, comprising all its members, which elects a 
Chairman, Executive Committee and a Secretary of the Board for 
carrying out its functions.  A CCB may raise funds through voluntary 
contributions, gifts, donations, grants and endowments for its declared 
objectives, i.e. establishing a needed welfare or development project for 
the community.  It may also receive project-based cost-sharing support 
from any local government in accordance with the provisions of the Local 
Government Ordnance.  
7.6.3. The law lays down that at least 25 per cent of the District development 
funds will be reserved for projects that will be identified, planned and 
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 sponsored by the CCBs. The Boards will submit the details of their 
development projects along with the proof that they have collected at 
least 20 per cent of the estimated cost specifically for that project. The 
Union Council and the Union Administration will then take up the project 
either with the Zila Council or the Tehsil Municipal Administration for 
approval and grant of the matching funds at the Union and/or Tehsil 
and/or District levels. Depending on the socio-economic characteristics of 
the Union, the District Government or the Tehsil Municipal Administration 
may grant funds up to 80 per cent of the total estimated cost.  Since 
development funds are available at all three levels, the Boards may seek 
funding from any level. Following the selection and approval of the 
project proposal by the Council, an agreement will be signed between the 
authorized official of the Local Government and the CCB.  
 
39
 
 
 
 
 
  
7.7. The current status of the registration of Citizen Community Boards is shown 
in Table 6. 
 
Status of Citizen Community Boards 
Province CCBs 
Applied For 
CCBs 
Registered
Level of 
Work 
Sector of Work 
Punjab 1580 1066 Union/ 
Tehsil 
Water, Sanitation, 
Education, Health 
NWFP 292 224 Union Water, Sanitation, 
Education, Health 
Sindh 254 213 Union/ 
Taluka 
Water, Sanitation, 
Education, Health 
Balochistan 10 05 Union Water, Sanitation, 
Education, Health 
Total 2136 1508   
Table 6 
Source: National Reconstruction Bureau 
 
7.8. Issues involving CCBs 
 
7.8.1. Slow registration of CCBs at all levels: A major problem has been 
the non-establishment/registration of CCBs. It is taking a lot of time for 
people to grasp the idea of the concept. This is also affecting the 
utilization of allocated funds for development projects to be implemented 
through the CCBs.  
7.8.2. Operational issues: In situations where CCBs have been established 
and registered, capacity of these entities and those of its members has 
found to be very weak. They have not been able to formulate projects to 
benefit from funding allocated by the local governments. Some CCBs are 
finding it difficult to arrange for 25% contribution to initiate projects. Non-
cooperation of the bureaucracy and elected councilors are also cited as 
some of the operational constraints. In many cases the required 
personnel of department for community development have not been 
posted. The new system tends to isolate the existing local organizations 
as it puts additional demand on them to fulfill various procedural 
requirements. It is also contended that in the plans proposed by CCBs 
are crowded by those put forward by the district development 
Committees.  
 
7.9. The new system calls for a number of structures to improve accountability in 
the system. These include Village / Neighborhood Councils, Monitoring 
Committees (District, Tehsil, Union), Musalihat (Reconciliation)Committee 
(By Unions), Zila Mohtasib (District Ombudsman) Ethics Committee at each 
level, Insaf Committee, Zila Mushawirat Committee (District Consultation 
Committee) etc. Unfortunately, none of these structures have been realized 
to exert any influence on the system. 
 
7.10. The possibility for effective accountability is further reduced due to unclear 
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 responsibilities and allocations of functions at all levels. Another factor is the 
lack of systems and structures to bring improvements in information 
availability for people. Common people which are aware do not have access 
to information while others are outright unaware. 
 
7.11. In addition to all the above, it is imperative to find ways and strategies to 
reduce projects and programs involving transfers from federal levels to the 
districts, especially those funded through foreign aid and districts be given 
resources to spend as per their own priorities. 
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8. Sampling from international experience 
 
8.1. A rich body of literature exists on the subject of decentralization and how it 
has fared in various parts of the world. This section aims to provide a 
sampling of international experiences in decentralization in order to provide a 
ground for concluding the findings on decentralization in Pakistan. Since the 
present study is looking at the process of implementation of decentralization 
in Pakistan including its design structures, the sampling makes a deliberate 
attempt to select related literature. It also looks at service delivery related 
experiences since that is the output of any decentralization effort. 
  
8.2. Manor22 provides broad but crucial conditions for the success of 
decentralization. According to him, decentralized systems must have: 
 
 Sufficient powers to exercise substantial influence within the political 
system and over significant development activities; 
 Sufficient financial resources to accomplish important tasks; 
 Adequate administrative capacity to accomplish those tasks; and 
 Reliable accountability mechanisms — to ensure both the accountability of 
elected politicians to citizens, and the accountability of bureaucrats to 
elected politicians. 
 
8.3. A number of other conditions are less than crucial, but their presence is quite 
helpful. It is especially helpful if a country has had some experience of 
democracy at higher levels prior to decentralization. Two other important and 
closely related factors are the existence of a lively civil society (organized 
interests with a significant degree of autonomy from the state) and the 
availability of social capital. It is nearly always helpful to have the former. The 
author goes on further and reassures that assertions about “Preconditions” 
for Successful Decentralization, including land reform and market orientation 
and private sector development as unfounded.  
 
8.4. Azfar23, on the other hand argues that decentralization improves governance 
and public service delivery by increasing: 
 
 Allocative efficiency—through better matching of public services to 
local preferences. 
 Productive efficiency—through increased accountability of local 
governments to citizens, fewer levels of bureaucracy, and better 
knowledge of local costs. 
 
8.5.  According to the author, however, this argument assumes that the devolution 
of functions occurs within an institutional environment that provides political, 
administrative, and financial authority to local governments, along with 
effective channels of local accountability and central oversight. These 
channels include: 
42
23 World Bank, Decentralization & governance: does decentralization improve service delivery? 2001 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
22 Manor, J. The political economy of democratic decentralization, World Bank 1999 
 
  
 Voice mechanisms for citizens to express their views to government 
bodies. 
 Exit mechanisms for citizens to switch to nonpublic service providers or 
to move to other localities. 
 Central government laws, rules, budget constraints, and oversight over 
local government operations, and channels for local governments to 
influence central government decisions concerning them. 
 Public sector management arrangements that promote accountability—
such as merit-based personnel policies and rules and arrangements 
promoting fiduciary accountability and constraining corruption. 
 
8.6.  According to research conducted in Philippines and Uganda, several 
conditions must be met before the full benefits of decentralization can be 
reaped. First, for decentralization to increase allocative and productive 
efficiency, local governments need to have the authority to respond to local 
demand as well as adequate mechanisms for accountability. Second, 
functions need to be devolved to a low enough level of government for 
allocative efficiency to increase as a result of decentralization. Third, citizens 
should have channels to communicate their preferences and get their voices 
heard in local governments. Citizens need to have information about 
government policies and activities. 
  
8.7. A study by UNDP24 involving nine countries looked into role of participation in 
improving service delivery and provides important lessons as follows: 
 
 The broader enabling environment for decentralization, including 
government policies and attitudes about local governments, is typically 
important for reform, but the degree of significance varies. 
 Carefully crafted new institutional structures that go beyond the 
common “businesses-usual” approach and alleviate the resistance of 
existing institutions to change can play an important role in supporting 
decentralization. 
 Enhanced community and neighborhood participation, if appropriately 
structured and implemented, are often critical in improving successful 
local government activities. 
 Appropriately designed partnerships among different interested parties 
can lead to major improvements in the way local governments do 
business. 
 Decentralization is normally thought of as a central government 
undertaking, but motivated actors from various levels of government 
and society can play a crucial role in initiating and/or energizing 
decentralization and local government reforms. 
 Decentralization reform programs need to integrate key components of 
local governance and service delivery systems rather than focus on 
single dimensions. 
                                                 
24 UNDP, The Role of Participation and Partnership in Decentralized Governance: A Brief Synthesis of 
Policy Lessons and Recommendations of Nine Country Case Studies on Service Delivery for the Poor 
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  Certain vital support components are required to operationalize and 
sustain decentralization reforms. 
 Decentralization is often seen as a goal or an output, but in fact, 
successful decentralization is a process--of gradually and strategically 
building capacity and trust. 
 There is a need for a clear and specific legal framework for 
decentralized governance that includes the constitutional devolution of 
political, financial and administrative powers to lower level units.  
 A long term developmental perspective on good local community 
governance should be encouraged that allows adequate time frames 
for learning-by-doing supplemented with demand-driven capacity 
development rather than the imposition of central standards and 
supply-driven training by means of rational project management 
mechanisms. 
 The enlargement of decentralized programs or the delegation of 
responsibilities for local services to lower level units must take the 
subsidiarity principle into account and involve commensurate transfers 
of financial resources and fiscal powers to ensure continued quality, 
coverage and sustainability of service delivery. 
 In creating effective decentralizing policies, strategic decisions relative 
to cost effectiveness and the extent of delegation of responsibilities 
need to be taken in a manner that ensures quality service delivery and 
accountability. Devolution of powers should also assess how increased 
costs for infrastructure and personnel are mitigated, public/private 
competition is accounted for, and accountability is structured. 
 Policies are needed for local government and those participating in it to 
have a stronger basis to increase transparency and improve 
accountability. These include developing indicators and standards for 
measuring performance in service delivery at the local level, 
strengthening guidelines for internal managerial controls, and 
broadening the role of oversight institutions which perform financial and 
service delivery audits, investigate corruption and irregularities and 
report to the public on their findings. 
 Capacity building is needed for all stakeholders. This includes training 
for Mayors and city councils, as well as community members, NGOs, 
CBOs and the private sector in participation and partnership methods 
and skills. 
 Local leaders should play an active role in harnessing government 
resources for the local programs and services and provide leadership 
in advocacy for and mobilization of adequate financial resources to 
sustain services. At the same time, they should continue to motivate 
and mobilize the local community to participate actively in ensuring that 
community standards and goals of the well-being of all members are 
met. 
 Local success might lead to its own undoing if it became flooded with 
increased demand from outside its jurisdiction. A successful innovative 
approach should be quickly replicated in order not to create demands 
that cannot be met by the innovative system and to ensure equity in 
service delivery. 
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8.8.  On specific components of decentralization, Shah25 provides important 
lessons for reform of fiscal systems in developing countries from various 
experiences. They include: 
 
 Enabling environment for decentralization i.e. institutions of citizen 
participation and accountability must be addressed in any serious 
reform of fiscal systems. 
 Societal norms and consensus on roles of various levels of 
governments and limits to their authorities are vital for the success of 
decentralized decision making. 
 Civil service reform is critical to the success of a decentralization 
program. 
 Evaluation capacity development is of fundamental importance in 
public sector reform in developing countries.  
 Traditional administrative capacity matters but should not be 
considered as an impediment to decentralization. 
 A major separation of spending and taxing decisions leads to lack of 
accountability in the public sector.  
 Sharing of revenues on a tax-by-tax basis distorts incentives for 
efficient tax collection. 
 Successful decentralization cannot be achieved in the absence of a 
well-designed fiscal transfers program.  
 The role of fiscal transfers in enhancing competition for the supply of 
public goods should not be overlooked.  
 A developing country institutional environment calls for a greater 
degree of decentralization than needed for an industrialized country. 
 
8.9. Bahl26 explains twelve implementation rules for fiscal decentralization. They 
are as follows: 
 
RULE #1 Fiscal Decentralization Should Be Viewed As A Comprehensive System 
RULE #2 Finance Follows Function 
RULE #3 There Must Be A Strong Central Ability To Monitor And Evaluate Decentralization 
RULE #4 One Intergovernmental System Does Not Fit The Urban And The Rural Sector  
RULE #5 Fiscal Decentralization Requires Significant Local Government Taxing Powers 
RULE #6 Central Governments Must Keep The Fiscal Decentralization Rules That They Make 
RULE #7 Keep It Simple 
RULE #8 The Design Of The Intergovernmental Transfer System Should Match The Objectives 
Of The Decentralization Reform 
RULE #9 Fiscal Decentralization Should Consider All Three Levels Of Government  
RULE #10 Impose A Hard Budget Constraint 
RULE #11 Recognize That Intergovernmental Systems Are Always In Transition and Plan For 
This  
RULE #12 There Must Be A Champion For Fiscal Decentralization 
 
8.10. Bird & Smart27 provide general insights into intergovernmental 
transfers, which are part of working of any government machinery. 
                                                 
25 Shah, Anwar, Balance, accountability and responsiveness: lessons about decentralization, World 
Bank, 1998  
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 First, as a rule there is a role for both general purpose transfers and for 
special purpose matching grants (e.g. for infrastructure). 
 Second, it is generally advisable, from the points of view of both the 
grantor and recipient governments, that the total pool of resources to 
be distributed in general purpose transfers be set in a stable but 
flexible way (e.g. as a percentage of central taxes, adjustable every 
few years). 
 Third, general purposes grant should take into account both need and 
capacity, but it should do so in as simple, reliable, and transparent a 
fashion as possible. 
 Fourth, if the general purpose grant is properly designed, and if local 
governments have some discretion in tax policy, there is no need to 
include specific incentive features to encourage additional tax effort. 
 Fifth, as a rule no conditions should be imposed (e.g. through 
earmarking or mandates) as to how such general purpose grants are 
spent. 
 Sixth, on the other hand special purpose grants should usually have a 
matching component, which probably should vary both with the type of 
expenditure and the fiscal capacity of the recipient. 
 Seventh, in particular to the extent such grants are intended to finance 
infrastructure, recipients should be required to satisfy technical 
conditions sufficient to ensure that the money is properly spent. 
 Eighth, and finally, all local governments should be required to manage 
financial matters in accordance with standard procedures, to maintain 
adequate and current accounts, and to be audited regularly and 
publicly. Similarly, although central governments should not pre-
approve or direct in detail local government budgets and activities, they 
should maintain up-to-date and complete information on local finances 
and make such information publicly available. In the world of 
intergovernmental fiscal relations, better information is not a luxury. It is 
an essential component of a well-functioning system. 
 
8.11. The theory of decentralization and experiences in its design and 
implementation clearly point towards some basic elements for success of 
decentralization. These elements include clear framework for decentralization 
under a recognized law, suitable responsibilities along with corresponding 
financial resources, participation of people, transparency and accountability. 
It is also clear that accountability is a long and demanding process requiring 
constant monitoring, updating and cannot be achieved overnight.  
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University of Toronto, 2001 
  
9. Conclusions & policy recommendations  
 
9.1. It is too early to assess the success or the failure of this experiment in 
decentralization and institutional reform in Pakistan. At this stage there are 
broader questions than answers; what were the intentions of military rulers 
given the history of local governments in Pakistan? What will be the status 
constitutional provisions guaranteeing the local governments in Pakistan, 
which have not been approved by legislatures and are already under fire after 
elections to national and provincial legislatures? Given the history in 
Pakistan, how will the local government system co-exist with the other tiers of 
government? Is it a suitable approach to have one formula for all of diverse 
Pakistan, if not, how will and to what extent will it be possible to bring suitable 
changes without compromising the status of local governments and 
accommodating the concerns of the provinces? When and how will issues in 
administrative decentralization be addressed which require substantial 
changes and reforms in the civil services of Pakistan? When and how fiscal 
issues faced by the system are addressed? How long will it take to bring 
changes in common attitudes about rights & responsibilities in Pakistan? 
What will it require? Will institutional changes be enough to bring about these 
changes? 
  
9.2. The system obviously has its strengths, weaknesses, offers opportunities and 
faces a number of threats. For the first time, many important elements have 
been made a part of the setup involving checks & balances and oversight 
over administration. Various levels of local institutions have elected 
thousands of men and women (for the first time). The local government 
ordinance empowers them to make important decisions dealing with not only 
local government functions but also the Annual Development Programs as 
well as poverty reduction programs. Conventional Civil Society theory 
(Putnam and others) stipulates that face to face interaction in resolving 
common problems would foster a tolerant political culture, moderate and 
pragmatic local leadership and shared power structures. There is enough 
evidence that institutional change brings a change in attitudes and behavior, 
albeit, very slowly. Women have been given 33 % of seats on the local 
bodies. Resultantly, around 40,000 women have been elected to local 
bodies. This has provided an unprecedented opportunity for women’s 
participation in the political process. Women councilors are expected to be 
more sensitive to the needs of their own gender and children. They are 
expected to make a significant impact on allocation of resources, design and 
implementation of social policies28. 
 
9.3. Weaknesses of the system stem from unclear responsibilities and roles 
specially the unclear fate of numerous laws from which the office of DC 
drawn its power, gaps in interrelationships among various actors, “one 
formula for all” approach, absence of devolution from federal to provincial 
levels, failure to undertake financial repercussions, issues relating to the 
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2001 
 capacity of both elected and other officials and bottlenecks in implementation. 
The set-up however offers many opportunities in the shape of hopes for 
empowerment of people and resolution of their local problems at local levels. 
The system is receiving unprecedented support from international partners as 
well. But at the same time, the system is at risk due to political reasons and 
troublesome constitutional position. 
 
9.4. Given the scope and objectives of the study, the following section provides 
policy recommendations in the light of its findings.  
 
9.5. Since the current study focused on the initial implementation of the local 
government and decentralization in Pakistan, it only measures the progress 
and not impact. It is proposed to conduct a detailed study on the impact of 
decentralization under the new local government after next elections to the 
local government are held. The study will aim at measuring the extent of 
decentralization in Pakistan on the pattern of similar studies conducted 
elsewhere.29 These studies not only measure the extent of decentralization 
but also test various hypotheses relating to its impact on various services. 
These studies also verify many of the theoretical benefits of decentralization 
as accruing to an area or population. In case of Pakistan, it would be 
appropriate to test the levels of participation, accountability mechanisms, 
impact on service delivery and transparency. 
 
9.6. Policy Recommendations  
 
9.6.1. General 
9.6.1.1. Institutional reform is a time consuming and demanding process. 
All stakeholders in the process should recognize this fact. While 
continuity is the key to success, it must be insured that suitable 
mechanisms are installed which will facilitate constant 
monitoring and troubleshooting of the process. 
9.6.1.2. Political will to undertake this reform process should continue. 
    
9.6.2. Political 
9.6.2.1. Independence for provinces to manage local govt. through 
constitution of a high-powered body from LGs. 
9.6.2.2. Ending uncertainty on constitutional position of LGs. 
9.6.2.3. Holding of next elections in one go for each province. 
9.6.2.4. Special focus on women councilors for enabling them to play a 
meaningful role 
9.6.2.5. Mechanisms for creating symbiotic relationship between LGs 
and other political tiers   
9.6.2.6. Translate Devolution Plan and LGO in regional and national 
language for wider dissemination and increased understanding. 
                                                 
29 See for example, Overview of rural decentralization in India, World Bank, Crook & Manor: 
Democracy & decentralization in South Asia & West Africa, 1998, Azfar, Kahkonen, and Meagher 
(2001) and World Bank’s decentralization assessment toolkit. 
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 9.6.2.7. Advocacy and awareness for better understanding about the 
Devolution of Power Plan to increase the demand from people 
over the system.  
9.6.2.8. Urgent need for focused training of elected councilors for: 
• Better understanding about working of councils  
• Individual capacity building  
• Working across party lines for communal development 
• Understand rights & duties, inter and intra council 
• Gender mainstreaming 
9.6.2.9. Effective media campaigns for voter’s education 
9.6.2.10. The LGO should have “assigned functions” for women as well 
so that male councilors do not side line them 
9.6.2.11. A set timing and place be designated and notified for holding of 
council sessions to avoid political or administrative manipulation 
and for convenience of women 
9.6.2.12. Election Commission should have a vigilant system for setting 
up of polling stations and occasions of obstruction to the right to 
vote especially for women 
9.6.2.13. Systematized database for enlisting and updating electoral rolls 
of LG Election  
9.6.2.14. Efficient arrangements for provision of ID cards 
9.6.2.15. Systematized infrastructure arrangements for holding LG 
elections. 
9.6.2.16. Continuous dissemination of information especially to political 
parties for better understanding and support of Devolution Plan 
9.6.2.17. Nazim be elected through direct election for increased 
accountability and reducing invisible political and related 
pressures 
9.6.2.18. Honorarium system be streamlined, across provinces, especially 
for women and they be also provided equivalent amount from 
same date 
9.6.2.19. Holding of elections on regular basis with provision for filling of 
vacant seats on immediate basis. 
  
9.6.3. Administrative 
 
9.6.3.1. Initiating comprehensive civil service reform involving creation of 
local government service and corresponding changes in existing 
service structures and occupational groups. 
9.6.3.2. Clarification of roles & responsibilities and reporting channels for 
the administrative entities. 
9.6.3.3. Clarification of the rules/statutes/laws, which have not been 
conferred to any entity after the so-called dismantling of the 
office of the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner. 
9.6.3.4. Strengthening the administrative coordination within a district.  
9.6.3.5. Initiating steps for stopping uncalled for transfers and postings 
specially those without the consent of the elected local 
representatives. 
9.6.3.6. Removing bar from local governments on hiring & firing where 
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 they can take up the costs. 
9.6.3.7. Allowing regrouping of the decentralized offices as per 
requirements of diversity. 
9.6.3.8. Focused and continuous mechanisms for training of the 
government officials at all tiers of LG level to: 
 Better understand LG system 
 Clarify their role and responsibilities vis-à-vis elected 
representatives 
 Gaining recognition and respect of the elected representative 
9.6.3.9. Better coordinating mechanism between elected representative 
and govt. officials through scheduled meetings at lease once a 
month for effective service delivery 
9.6.3.10. Committees under LGO be given orientation and training for 
coming up with holistic and cohesive work plans 
9.6.3.11. The improvisation in the LG systems as identified by provinces 
to be incorporated before conduct of new LG elections 
9.6.3.12. Establishment and strengthening of LG commissions at 
Provincial level  
9.6.3.13. Establishment of National and Provincial Public Safety 
Commission of police down to the Union Council level  
 
9.6.4. Financial 
 
9.6.4.1. Strengthening & activation of Provincial Finance Commissions 
9.6.4.2. Further streamlining of processes for transfer of funds from 
province to districts and further down. 
9.6.4.3. Improving coordination between Govt. officials and Council on 
budgetary issues 
9.6.4.4. Timely release of development funds should be ensured 
9.6.4.5. Audit and Accounts departments of government should come up 
with manual (systems & procedures) to manage finances 
9.6.4.6. Issues of generation of taxes and its disbursement needs 
clarification and better understanding both for officials and 
councilors through effective training 
 
9.6.5. Development 
 
9.6.5.1. A quarterly meeting of MNA, MPA and District Nazims to chalk 
out development strategies and synchronize allocation and 
utilization of development funds for the area. 
9.6.5.2. Provision of support (funding/technical assistance) for formation 
and activation of CCBs. 
9.6.5.3. Allocation and distribution of development funds should be equal 
between men and women councilors. 
9.6.5.4. Representative on reserved seats should also be allocated 
development funds with defined parameters for expenditures 
9.6.5.5. Allocation of development funds should be devoid of political 
affiliations. 
9.6.5.6. Activating of monitoring committees after analysis for utility. 
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 9.6.5.7. Creation of funds designed specially for district governments to 
enable them to plan and implement priority programs. These 
funds may be created for only those services that are the 
responsibility of districts and not those involving either inter-
district or inter-provincial coordination or requiring cost affectivity 
considerations.  
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 Appendices 
APPENDIX-1 
 
UNION COUNCIL ELECTIONS IN PAKISTAN 2000-2001 
Dates December 
2000 
March 
2001 
May  
2001 
July  
2001 
August 
2001 
Total 
Number of 
Districts 
18 20 20 31 11 100 
Number of 
Union Councils 
959 1459 1577 1677 353 6022 
Number of 
Union Council 
Seats 
20076 30639 33117 35217 7413 126462 
Source: Local Government Elections 2001 by Pattan Development Organization & DIFD 
Note:  The table reports elections to 100 District while the text states the number 96; this 
is a result of merger of 5 Karachi Districts after the elections. The table shows the 
potential total of Union Councilors (6022x21) however, not all seats were filled. 
 
APPENDIX –2 
 
UNION COUNCILORS’ LITERACY LEVELS  
Category Nazim Naib 
Nazim 
General 
Muslim 
Female 
Muslim 
Peasant/ 
Workers 
Minority 
Illiterate 0% 0% 11.4% 45% 18.3% 42.7% 
Literate 100% 100% 88.6% 55% 81.7% 57.3% 
Source: Local Government Elections 2001 by Pattan Development Organization & DIFD 
 
APPENDIX – 3 
 
GENDER PROFILE OF LOCAL ELECTIONS PAKISTAN 2000-2002 
Province Union Council Level Tehsil/Taluka Council & District 
Council 
 Women 
Nazims 
Women 
Union 
Councilors 
Total 
Union 
Council
Seats 
Women 
Councilors 
as a % of 
Total 
Women 
Tehsil/ 
Taluka 
Nazims 
Women 
Tehsil/ 
Taluka 
Councilors 
Women 
District 
Nazims 
Women 
District 
Councilors
Punjab 2 13457 72513 18.6 - 848 - 641 
Sindh - 4095 22974 17.8 - 306 2 158 
Balochistan - 2807 20097 14.0 - 66 - 103 
NWFP - 1605 10878 14.8 - 124 - 65 
Total 2 21964 126462 17.4 0 1344 2 967 
Source: Local Government Elections 2001 by Pattan Development Organization & DIFD 
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 APPENDIX – 4 
 
Decentralised Offices 
(i) Civil Defence 
(ii) Agriculture (Extension) 
(iii) Livestock 
(iv) On-Farm Water Management 
(v) Soil Conservation 
(vi) Soil Fertility 
(vii) Fisheries 
(viii) Forests** 
(ix) Labour 
(x) Social Welfare 
(xi) Sports and Culture 
(xii) Cooperatives 
(xiii) Boys Schools 
(xiv) Girls Schools 
(xv) Technical Education 
(xvi) Colleges, (other than 
professional) 
(xvii) Sports 
(xviii) Special Education 
(xix) Accounts, (excluding District 
Accounts Offices) 
(xx) Basic & Rural Health 
(xxi) Child & Woman Health 
(xxii) Population Welfare 
(xxiii) Hospitals 
(xxiv) Environment 
(xxv) Land Revenue, Estate, 
(xxvi) Excise and Taxation 
(xxvii) Housing Urban and Physical 
Planning and Public Health 
Engineering 
(xxviii) Local Government & Rural 
Development 
(xxix) District Roads and Buildings 
(xxx) Transport. 
 
Part-B 
Other Offices 
(i) Coordination 
(ii) Human Resource Management 
(iii) Community Organization 
(iv) Registration Office 
(v) Enterprise and Investment 
Promotion. 
(vi) Legal advice and drafting 
(vii) Planning & Development 
(viii) Public Health 
(ix) Information Technology 
Development 
(x) Information Technology Promotion 
(xi) Database 
(xii) Literacy Campaigns 
(xiii) Continuing Education 
(xiv) Vocational Education 
(xv) Energy (Micro energy 
development / generation projects for 
use at local community level) 
(xvi) Finance & Budget 
 
Part-C 
Groups of Offices 
(i) District Coordination: 
Coordination, Human Resource 
Management and Civil Defence. 
(ii) Agriculture: Agriculture 
(Extension), Livestock, Farm Water 
Management, Soil Conservation, Soil 
Fertility, Fisheries, and Forests. 
(iii) Community Development: 
Community Organization, Labour, 
Social Welfare, Sports and Culture, 
Cooperatives, and Registration office. 
(iv) Education: Boys Schools, Girls 
Schools, Technical Education, 
Colleges, (other than professional) 
Sports (Education) and Special 
Education. 
(v) Finance and Planning: Finance & 
Budget, Planning & Development, 
Accounts, Enterprise and Investment 
Promotion. 
(vi) Health: Public Health, Basic & 
Rural Health, Child & Woman Health, 
Population Welfare, District and Tehsil 
(Hqrs.) hospitals. 
(vii) Information Technology: 
Information Technology Development, 
Information Technology Promotion, 
and Database. 
(viii) Law: Legal advice and drafting, 
and *Environment. 
(ix) Literacy: Literacy Campaigns, 
Continuing Education, and ocational 
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 Education. 
(x) Revenue: Land Revenue & Estate 
and Excise and Taxation. 
(xi) Works and Services: Spatial 
Planning and Development, District 
Roads and Buildings, Energy and 
Transport. 
 
Part D 
Group of Offices Offices 
(i) Public Transport Public 
transportation and mass transit 
Passenger and freight transit terminals 
Traffic planning, engineering and 
parking 
(ii) Enterprise and Investment 
Promotion Industrial estates and 
technological Parks Cottage, small and 
medium sized enterprise promotion 
Investment promotion and protection 
(iii) Depending upon the economies of 
scale and nature of infrastructure the 
City District Government may vary 
grouping of offices contained in Part-C 
and set up district municipal offices for 
integrated development and 
management of the following services: 
a. Water source development and 
management, storage, treatment 
plants, and macro-distribution. 
b. Sewage tertiary and secondary 
network, treatment plants, and 
disposal. 
c. Storm water drainage network and 
disposal. 
d. Flood control protection and rapid 
response contingency plans. 
e. Natural disaster and civil defence 
planning. 
f. Solid waste management, treatment 
and disposal, including land fill sites 
and recycling plants. 
g. Industrial and hospital hazardous 
and toxic waste treatment and 
disposal. 
h. Environmental control, including 
control of air, water, and soil pollution 
in accordance with federal and 
provincial laws and standards. 
i. Master planning, land use, zoning 
and classification, reclassification. 
j. Urban design and urban renewal 
programme; promulgation of building 
rules and planning standards. 
k. Parks, forests, play grounds, 
sporting, and other recreational 
facilities. 
l. Museums, art galleries, libraries, 
community and cultural centres. 
m. Conservation of historical and 
cultural assets n. Landscape, 
monuments, and municipal 
ornamentation. 
o. Urban and housing development, 
including urban improvement and 
upgrading, and urban renewal and 
redevelopment, with care being taken 
to preserve historical and cultural 
monuments. 
p. Regional markets and city-wide 
commercial centres. 
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 Appendix - 5 
 
TAX JURIXDICTION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 
District (Zila) Council 
1 Education Tax 
2 Health Tax 
3 Tax on vehicles other than motor vehicles 
4 Any other tax authorized by the Government 
5 Local rate on lands assessable to land revenue 
6 Fees in respect of schools, colleges and health facilities established or maintained by 
the district government 
7 Fees for license granted by the district government 
8 Fees for specific services rendered by a district government 
9 Collection charges for recovery of tax on behalf of the government 
10 Toll on new roads, bridges within the limits of a district, other than national and 
provincial highways and roads 
Tehsil/Taluka/Town Councils 
1 Local tax on services 
2 Tax on transfer of immovable property 
3 Property tax on annual rental value of buildings and lands 
4 Fee on advertisements and billboards 
5 Fee for fairs, agricultural shows, cattle fairs, industrial exhibitions, tournaments and 
other public events 
6 Fee for approval of buildings plans and erection and re-erection of buildings 
7 Fee for licenses or permits and penalties or fines for violation of the licensing rules 
8 Charges for execution and maintenance of works of public utility like lighting of public 
places, drainage, conservancy and water supply 
9 Fee on cinemas, dramatical, theatrical shows and tickets thereof and other 
entertainment 
10 Collection charges for recovery of any tax on behalf of the Government, District 
Government, Union Administration of any statutory authority 
Union Councils 
1 Fees for licensing of professions an vocations 
2 Fee on sale of animals and cattle markets 
3 Market fees 
4 Fees for certification of births, marriages and deaths 
5 Charges for specific services rendered by the union council 
6 Rate for the remuneration of Village and Neighborhood guards 
7 Rate for execution or maintenance of any work of public utility like lighting of public 
places, drainage, conservancy and water supply 
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 Appendix - 6 
 
Interview Questionnaires 
 
District Govt.:   
City District:   
Check List 
 Functioning of new Structures  
1. District Public Safety Commission (DPSC)  
 i. Has the DPSC been constituted? Yes No 
 ii. If yes,  
 a. Have the election of members of DPSC from Zila  Council 
been held? 
 
Yes No 
 b. Have the other half number of DPSC been nominated? Yes No 
 iii. Have the DPSC started functioning?  Yes No 
 iv. Has the linkage between Union Public Safety Committees and  DPSC 
been established?  
 
Yes No 
 v. By what date the constitution of commission is planned?  
  ………………………………………………………………….  
   
2. Zila Mohtasib (ZM)  
 i. Has the Zila Mohtasib been appointed? Yes No 
 ii. If no, has the selection been finalized? Yes No 
 iii. If yes, by what date the ZM shall finally be constituted and 
 commence functioning?  
 
  ………………………………………………………………….  
   
3. Zila Mushawarit Committee (ZMC)  
 i. Has the ZMC been constituted?  Yes No 
 ii. If yes,  
 a. Has it started functioning?  Yes No 
 b. Does it have a secretariat? Yes No 
 c. What agenda has been carried out for ZMC?  
  ………………………………………………………………….  
 iii. If no, by what date the constitution of ZMC is planned?  
  ………………………………………………………………….  
   
4. Monitoring Committees (MCs)  
 i. Have all the monitoring committees been elected?  Yes No 
 ii. Have the MCs started functioning? Yes No 
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  iii. Have the MCs compiled quarterly reports and submitted to the  Zila 
council? 
 
Yes No 
 iv. What is disposal of quarterly reports submitted by MCs?  
  ………………………………………………………………….  
   
5. Complaint Cell (CC)  
 i. Has the Complaint Cell been organized? Yes No 
 ii. What is composition of the Cell?  
  …………………………………………………………………..  
 iii. What role have this cell been assigned?  
  …………………………………………………………………..  
 iv. If the cell has started functioning what type of complaints are  generally 
being received? 
 
  …………………………………………………………………..  
 v. What is disposal of complaints?  
  …………………………………………………………………..  
   
 
6. Citizen Community Boards (CCBs)  
 Has any CCB been registered with EDO (CD)? Yes No 
  a. How many?  
  ………………………………………………………………….  
  b. What is the nature of work?  
  ………………………………………………………………….  
  c. What is the progress?  
  ………………………………………………………………….  
   
7. District Groups of Offices  
 i. Have all EDOs been posted for all the offices? Yes No 
 ii. What is the state of posting of lower staff i.e. DOs and clerks  etc in 
case of each office? 
 
  ………………………………………………………………….  
 iii. What/how is the inter office functioning of the district offices?  
  ………………………………………………………………….  
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 District Groups of Offices 
 
District Coordination (DCO): 
Coordination 
Human Resource Management 
Civil Defence 
 
Agriculture (EDO): 
Agriculture (Extension) 
Livestock 
Farm Water Management 
Soil Conservation 
Soil Fertility 
Fisheries 
Forests 
Community Development (EDO): 
Community Organization 
Labour 
Social Welfare 
Sports and Culture 
Cooperatives 
Registration office 
 
 
Education (EDO): 
Boys Schools 
Girls Schools 
Technical Education 
Colleges 
(Other than professional) Sports (Education) 
Special Education 
 
Finance and Planning (EDO): 
Finance & Budget 
Planning & Development 
Accounts 
Enterprise & Investment Promotion 
 
Health (EDO): 
Public Health 
Basic & Rural Health 
Child & Woman Health 
Population Welfare 
District and Tehsil (Hqrs.) hospitals 
 
Information Technology (EDO): 
Information Technology Development 
Information Technology Promotion 
Database 
 
Law (EDO): 
Legal advice and Drafting 
Environment  
 
Literacy (EDO): 
Literacy Campaigns 
Continuing Education 
Vocational Education 
Revenue: 
Land Revenue & Estate 
Excise and Taxation 
 
Works and Services (EDO): 
Spatial Planning & Development 
Districts Roads and Buildings, 
Energy & Transport
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8. NARIMS  
 Is the office of EDO (IT) equipped to operate PC-1?  Yes No 
  a. Does it has qualified staff?  Yes No 
  b. Does it has the required Software & Hardware? Yes No 
  c. Is the district able to work through PC-1? Yes No 
  d. What is the stage of training/preparation of the staff?  
  ………………………………………………………………….  
   
9. Lady Councillors (LCs)  
 i. What is the approach/attitude of Lady Councillors?  
  ………………………………………………………………….  
 ii. Are the lady Councillors satisfied with the working of Council? Yes No 
 iii. Do they play any role in the development work? Yes No 
 iv. Do they enjoy full rights as Councillors? Yes No 
 v. Do they have any complaints and what is the nature of  complaints?  
  ………………………………………………………………….  
 vi. What is your attitude towards LCs?  
  ………………………………………………………………….  
   
10. Devolved Departments (DDs)  
 i. Have the departments like PHE, LG&RD and H&PP been devolved to the TMA?  
Yes No 
 ii. What is the status of these departments?  
  ………………………………………………………………….  
 
 
 iii. Are they fully under TMA or are still having provincial links/functioning?  
  ………………………………………………………………….  
 iv. Are these departments fully functional at TMAs as provided by the law?  
Yes No 
 v. If no, why?  
  ………………………………………………………………….  
 
 
1. Administrative/Political 
Functioning of Zila Council 
• How is the Zila council functioning? 
• Are the meetings held regularly every month? 
• Is there any workload problem of Nazim / Naib Nazim? 
• How is the agenda for ZC meetings prepared? 
• How and how many days in advance the members are informed about the agenda and 
the meetings? 
Intergovernmental relationships 
• What is the nature of relationship (cooperation, attitude) of district nazim / ZC with 
o Provincial government  
o Local Administration 
o Law enforcement agencies 
2. Development Planning 
• What are the main development challenges faced by the Zilla? 
• Who carries out the need assessment of the projects? 
• Do the district development plans and budget reflect these problems / projects? 
• If not, why? What are the problems faced in this respect? 
• How are the projects discussed/approved in the council? 
• How the budget is presented and approved or otherwise? 
• How are the allocations of funds for various projects carried out? 
• Are any funds allocated for individual members as well? 
3. Financial matters 
• What is the financial position of the Zilla? 
• Are any new taxes imposed? 
• What is the position of tax collection in the zilla? 
• What problems are being faced in revenue generation by the zilla? 
• What is the status of following the accounting and auditing procedures in districts? 
• What kinds of problems are being faced in financial matters with respect to provinces? 
• What kinds of problems are being faced in financial matters within the zilla and with 
Tehsils and Unions? 
4. Responsiveness, participation and service delivery 
• What is the people’s response to various committees? 
• Have the monitoring Committees prepared and submitted quarterly reports to the 
council? 
• How the reports or points raised by monitoring committees are tackled/problems and 
issues resolved? 
• Has the ZC prepared any resolution authorizing the Nazims to take action on identified 
issues? 
• What has been the impact of devolution on various services (social & others) after the 
devolution plan? (In terms of attendance of employees, number of complaints, speed of 
processing of routine services (e.g. domicile, registration of births, land transfers etc) 
 
5. What would you suggest for improving the working of ZC and district government? 
 
 
Tehsil Municipal Administration:   
     
Check List 
 
1. Village/Neighborhood Councils (VCs/NCs)  
 i. Have all the village/neighborhood councils been notified by the  
 council? 
 
Yes No 
 ii. If yes, have all the village/neighbourhood councils been  elected?  
Yes No 
 iii. If yes, how is the VC/NC functioning?  
 …………………………………………………………………. 
 
…………………………………………………………………. 
 
 
 iv. What is the type of inter play of UCs with the VCs/NCs? 
 
 
  ………………………………………………………………….  
 v. Are UCs using VC/NC for any role of public welfare/interest 
 related assignments? 
 
Yes No 
   
2. Citizen Community Boards (CCBs)  
 Has any CCB been registered from your area? Yes No 
  If yes,  
  a. How many?  
  ………………………………………………………………….  
  b. What is the nature of work?  
  ………………………………………………………………….  
  c. What is the progress?  
  ………………………………………………………………….  
   
3. Tehsil/Town Offices  
 i. Have all the Tehsil/Town offices been completed? Yes No 
 ii. Have all the TOs been posted? Yes No 
 iii. Have the required staff been posted to the Tehsil/Town offices? Yes No 
 iv. How is TMA functioning?  
  ………………………………………………………………….  
 v. Is the TMA functioning as provided in the law? Yes No 
 vi. Any interference from district in the TMA’s affairs? Yes No 
 vii. If yes, What kind of the interference is there?  
  ………………………………………………………………….  
 viii. Has any function of TMA been taken over by the district? Yes No 
 ix. Has the TMA’s joint committees been formed? Yes No 
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 x. How is it functioning?  
  ………………………………………………………………….  
 xi. How many meeting have been held till today?  
  ………………………………………………………………….  
 xii. Is TMA getting fiscal transfer/grants from the districts? Yes No 
   
4. Lady Councillors (LCs)  
 i. What is the approach/attitude of Lady Councillors?  
  ………………………………………………………………….  
 ii. Are the lady Councillors satisfied with the working of Council? Yes No 
 iii. Do they play any role in the development work? Yes No 
 iv. Do they enjoy full rights as Councillors? Yes No 
 v. Do they have any complaints against TMA and what is the 
 nature of complaints? 
 
  ………………………………………………………………….  
 vi. What is your attitude towards LCs?  
  ………………………………………………………………….  
   
5. Devolved Departments (DDs)  
 i. Have the departments like PHE, LG&RD and H&PP been 
 devolved to the TMA? 
 
Yes No 
 ii. What is the status of these departments?  
  ………………………………………………………………….  
 iii. Are they fully under TMA or are still having provincial 
 links/functioning? 
 
  ………………………………………………………………….  
 iv. Are these departments fully functional at TMA as provided by  the 
law? 
 
Yes No 
 v. If no, why?  
  ………………………………………………………………….  
 vi. Who is performing the following functions?   
  a. Water supply, sewerage, drainage;  
  ………………………………………………………………….  
  b. Sanitation;  
  ………………………………………………………………….  
  c. Katchi abadi regularization/upgrading;  
  ………………………………………………………………….  
  d. Internal roads and street lighting.  
  ………………………………………………………………….  
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6. 
Staff Posting 
 
 Report on appointment:   
  a. TMO Yes No 
  b. TO Infrastructure and services Yes No 
  c. TO Regulation Yes No 
  d. TO Finance Yes No 
  e. TO Planning Yes No 
  f. Cos Yes No 
 ii. Report on posting of other staff.  
  ………………………………………………………………….  
 iii. What are the staff posting?  
  ………………………………………………………………….  
   
7. 
Chief Officer units  
 
 i. Is the former Chief Officer (CO) Unit operational? Yes No 
 ii. Is CO unit getting funds for:   
  a. Operational cost? Yes No 
  b. Salaries? Yes No 
  c. Development? Yes No 
 iii. What functions CO unit is performing and what function  previously 
were performed by it as Town/Municipal  Committee and Municipal 
Corporation? 
 
  ………………………………………………………………….  
 iv. What are the problems and issues in the CO units  
  ………………………………………………………………….  
 v. Has service delivery been reorganized:  
  a. In CO unit? Yes No 
  b.  Outside CO unit (rural areas, villages)? Yes No 
 vi. Are there any plans to extend service delivery to areas outside  CO 
unit? 
Yes No 
   
8. 
Reporting Systems 
 
 i. Internal Reporting:   
  a. What systems have been introduced for internal   
 reporting (i) between various offices of the TMA (TO  
 offices and CO unit) and the TMO? (ii) Between CO   unit 
and various TO offices? 
 
  ………………………………………………………………….  
  b. Is there a coordination mechanism at TMO level or at  
 TOs level? 
 
Yes No 
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 ii. External Reporting.  
  a. What reports are being sent to (i) District government,  
 (ii) Provincial government? 
 
  ………………………………………………………………….  
  b. Are reports being sent to district government in continue  
 or on specific enquiry by them? 
 
  ………………………………………………………………….  
  c. Do any of the TO offices report to any department of the  
 Provincial government other than Local Government   dept? 
 
 
Yes No 
   If yes, why: on specific request or demand, or in routine?  
  ………………………………………………………………….  
  d. Are the PHED Staff in the TO (I & S) reporting to any  
 other level (i) directly or (ii) through TMO?  
 
Yes No 
  ………………………………………………………………….  
   If yes, why and for what particular purpose?  
  ………………………………………………………………….  
   
9. Service Delivery   
 i. What is the status of service delivery carried out by the TMA?  
  ………………………………………………………………….  
 ii. Are the rural water supply schemes formerly run by PHED  now 
being run by TMA? 
 
Yes No 
  If yes,  
  a. Details of funds provided by the provincial government  
 to run these schemes? 
 
  ………………………………………………………………….  
  b. If funds from provincial government have not been  
 received to cover operational cost, how are these   
 schemes being operated? 
 
  ………………………………………………………………….  
 iii. Are any functions/services being considered for transfer to 
 Union Administration?  
 
Yes No 
  If yes, what functions/services are being considered?  
  ………………………………………………………………….  
   
10. 
Octroi Compensatory Grant 
 
 i. Has OC Grant being received? Yes No 
 ii. If yes, how many transfers, amounts, regularity?  
  ………………………………………………………………….  
 iii. What deductions have been made by provincial government:   
  a) amount  b) purpose (for what)?  
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  ………………………………………………………………….  
 iv. a. Have the functions transferred from former   
  town/municipal committees and municipal corporations  
 (health centers/dispensaries, schools, industrial homes,  
 library, vet dispensaries, etc) to the district government   been 
handed over? 
 
 
 
Yes No 
  b. What staff adjustments for these have been made?  
  ………………………………………………………………….  
  c. Are the funds to pay salaries and operational cost for the 
  transferred functions deducted from the Octroi   
 Compensatory Grant or from other transfer from   
 provincial government?  
 
 
Yes No 
  
  If yes, give details. 
 
  ………………………………………………………………….  
   
11. 
Property Tax 
 
 i. Is the Property Tax being transferred to the TMA? Yes No 
 ii. a. Are there any deductions being made from the 
PropertyTax? 
Yes No 
  b. If yes, for what?  
  ………………………………………………………………….  
  c. Have the details of the deductions been provided?  Yes No 
  ………………………………………………………………….  
  d. If they have been provided, have they been reconciled by 
  the TMA from its own account books/records? 
 
  ………………………………………………………………….  
 iii. Give details of total Property Tax due  
  a. As per last year,  
  ………………………………………………………………….  
  b. Transfers this year so far, and  
  ………………………………………………………………….  
  c. Deductions made from transferred accounts this year.  
  ………………………………………………………………….  
  
 
 
 
12. 
KPP Funds 
 
 i. a. Have KPP funds for TMA’s exclusive functions been  
 transferred by provincial or district government? 
 
Yes No 
  b. If so, what proportion of total funds of district?  
  ………………………………………………………………….  
  c. Are their any conditions attached to these funds? Yes No 
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  d. Who approves KPP schemes for TMA’s exclusive  
  functios? 
 
  ………………………………………………………………….  
 ii. Provide details: Schemes, total funds required, amount  transferred, 
approval procedure, etc. 
 
  ………………………………………………………………….  
  ………………………………………………………………….  
  
 
 
13. 
Development Funds 
 
 i. Are  funds for development transferred to TMA by  
  a.  provincial government Yes No 
  b. district government Yes No 
  c. provincial government through district government. Yes No 
 ii. Are the funds transfers according to:  
  a.  (i) pre-approved schemes or (ii) lump sum by sector or  
 (iii) totals not allocated by schemes or sections, or, (iv)  
 something difference. 
 
  ………………………………………………………………….  
  b. provide details of amounts, schemes, transfer etc.  
  ………………………………………………………………….  
 
1. Administrative/Political 
Functioning of Tehsil Council 
• How is the Tehsil council functioning? 
• Are the meetings held regularly every month? 
• Is there any work load problem of Nazim / Naib Nazim? 
• How is the agenda for TC meetings prepared? 
• How and how many days in advance the members are informed about the agenda and 
the meetings? 
Intergovernmental relationships 
• What is the nature of relationship (cooperation, attitude) of tehsil nazim / TC with 
o District government  
o Local Administration 
o Law enforcement agencies 
o Line departments 
2. Development Planning 
• What are the main development challenges faced by the Tehsil? 
• Who carries out the need assessment of the schemes? 
• Do the tehsil development plans and budget reflect these problems / schemes? 
• If not, why? What are the problems faced in this respect? 
• How are the projects discussed/approved in the council? 
• How the budget is presented and approved or otherwise? 
• How are the allocations of funds for various schemes carried out? 
• Are any funds allocated for individual members as well? 
3. Financial matters 
• What is the financial position of the Tehsil? 
• Are any new taxes imposed? 
• What is the position of tax collection in the Tehsil? 
• What problems are being faced in revenue generation by the Tehsil? 
• Is there a change in collection of user charges by the tehsil? 
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• What is the status of following the accounting and auditing procedures in tehsils? 
• What kinds of problems are being faced in financial matters with respect to districts? 
• What kinds of problems are being faced in financial matters within the Tehsil and with 
Unions? 
4. Responsiveness, participation and service delivery 
• What is the people’s response to various committees? 
• Have the monitoring Committees prepared and submitted quarterly reports to the council. 
• How the reports or points raised by monitoring committees are tackled/problems and 
issues resolved 
• Has the TC prepared any resolution authorizing the Nazims to take action on identified 
issues 
• What has been the impact of devolution on various services (social & others) after the 
devolution plan? (In terms of attendance of employees, number of complaints, speed of 
processing of routine services (e.g. domicile, registration of births, land transfers etc), 
collection of user charges/fees) 
 
 
5. What would you suggest for improving the working of TC and Tehsil Administration? 
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Union Administration:  
        
Check List 
 
1. Musalihat Anjuman (MA)  
 1. Has the MA been constituted? Yes No 
  If yes,  
 
 a. Has the MA started functioning? 
Yes No 
  b. What type of disputes/matters are referred to MA?  
  ………………………………………………………………….  
  c.  What modalities are being followed by MA for dispute  
  resolution? 
 
  ………………………………………………………………….  
  d. Have some minor cases been referred to MA by the  
  Courts? 
 
Yes No 
   
2. Citizen Community Boards (CCBs)  
 Has any CCB been registered from your area? Yes No 
  If yes,  
  a. How many?  
  ………………………………………………………………….  
  b. What is the nature of work?  
  ………………………………………………………………….  
  c. What is the progress?  
  ………………………………………………………………….  
  
 
 
 
   
3. Union Council (UC)   
 i. How the UC is functioning  
  ………………………………………………………………….  
 ii. What are work load distributions of Union Nazim and Naib  Union 
Nazim? 
 
  ………………………………………………………………….  
 iii. a. Has the Union got any grants/funds allotted from the  
  Province? 
 
Yes No 
  b. District? Yes No 
  c. Tehsil? Yes No 
 iv. Is there any development project at Union level identified or 
 executed? 
 
Yes No 
 v. What is role/functioning of union councils?  
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  ………………………………………………………………….  
   
4. Lady Councillors (LCs)  
 i. What is the approach/attitude of Lady Councillors?  
  ………………………………………………………………….  
 ii. Are the lady Councillors satisfied with the working of Council? Yes No 
 iii. Do they play any role in the development work? Yes No 
 iv. Do they enjoy full rights as Councillors? Yes No 
 v. Do they have any complaints against UA and what is the  nature 
 of complaints? 
 
  ………………………………………………………………….  
 vi. What is your attitude towards LCs?  
  ………………………………………………………………….  
   
5. Union Public Safety Committee (UPSC)  
 i. Has the Committee been constituted? Yes No 
 ii. Has the Committee started functioning? Yes No 
 iii. How the Committee is functioning? Yes No 
  ………………………………………………………………….  
 iv. Is there any interaction with the Local Police? Yes No 
 v. How the excesses by police against public are identified?  
  ………………………………………………………………….  
 vi. What is the method of reporting about police excesses?  
  ………………………………………………………………….  
 vii. How the public safety committees created linkage with DPSC?  
  ………………………………………………………………….  
 viii. What actions are taken by Union Nazim on the reports of public  safety 
committee? 
 
  ………………………………………………………………….  
   
6. Reporting System  
 i. Is there any coordination mechanism at UA level? Yes No 
 ii. What reports are being sent to:  
  a.  TMA  
  ………………………………………………………………….  
  b. District government  
  ………………………………………………………………….  
 
1. Administrative/Political 
Functioning of Union Council 
• Is the Union Council meeting regularly every month? 
• What are workload distributions of Union Nazim and Naib Union Nazim? 
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• How is the agenda for the Union Council meetings prepared and members informed? 
• How and how many days in advance the members are informed about the agenda and 
the meetings? 
Intergovernmental relationships 
• What is the nature of relationship (cooperation, attitude) of union nazim / UC with 
o District government 
o Tehsil Administration  
o Local Administration 
o Law enforcement agencies 
o Line departments 
o Village / Neighborhood councils 
2. Development Planning 
• What are the main development challenges faced by the Union? 
• Who carries out the need assessment of the schemes? 
• Do the tehsil development plans and budget reflect these problems / schemes? 
• If not, why? What are the problems faced in this respect? 
• Is there any development project at Union level identified or executed? 
• How are the projects discussed/approved in the council? 
• How the budget is presented and approved or otherwise? 
• How are the allocations of funds for various schemes carried out? 
• Are any funds allocated for individual members as well? 
3. Financial matters 
• What is the financial position of the Union? 
• Has the Union got any grants/funds allocated from the Province, District and Tehsil? 
• Are any new fees / rates imposed? 
• What is the position of fees / rates collection in the Union? 
• What problems are being faced in revenue generation by the Union? 
• Is there a change in collection of user charges by the Union? 
• What is the status of following the accounting and auditing procedures in Union? 
• What kinds of problems are being faced in financial matters with respect to districts, 
Tehsils? 
• What kinds of problems are being faced in financial matters within the Union? 
4. Responsiveness, participation and service delivery 
• What is the people’s response to various committees? 
• Have the monitoring Committees prepared and submitted quarterly reports to the council. 
• How the reports or points raised by monitoring committees are tackled/problems and 
issues resolved 
• Has the UC prepared any resolution authorizing the Nazims to take action on identified 
issues 
• What has been the impact of devolution on various services (social & others) after the 
devolution plan? (In terms of attendance of employees, number of complaints, speed of 
processing of routine services (e.g. domicile, registration of births, land transfers etc), 
collection of user charges/fees) 
 
What would you suggest for improving the working of UC and Union Administration? 
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